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JURISDICTION UNDER THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT FOR NAZI
WAR CRIMES OF PLUNDER
AND EXPROPRIATION
Michael D. Murray *
I.
INTRODUCTION
Six masterpieces of the famous Austrian painter Gustav Klimt are
missing from Maria Altmann's home because they were stolen by the
Nazis in the period immediately preceding and during World War 11.1
Today, the paintings reside in the Austrian Gallery, an agency and
instrumentality of the Republic of Austria-the same place where the
paintings were sent by agents of the Third Reich who looted the prop-
erty of Ms. Altmann's uncle, a Jewish sugar merchant named Ferdi-
nand Bloch.2 Austria had been annexed by Nazi Germany prior to
these events. Jews like Ms. Altmann's family were targeted for organ-
ized theft of their private property, including valuable works of art, in
contravention of the international laws of war.
3
Claims in United States courts for recovery of property stolen,
looted, or expropriated in wartime encounter many procedural hur-
dles.4 When the property lies in the hands of the government of a
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, Ur-
bana-Champaign. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and input of
Professors James Pfander and Thomas Ginsburg of the University of Illinois College
of Law, and Professor Richard Seamon of the University of South Carolina School of
Law, and the helpful advice of Professors Richard Kaplan, Jay Kesan, and Richard
McAdams, all of the University of Illinois College of Law. The author also gratefully
acknowledges the research and assistance of David Wissbroecker, J.D. 2003, Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Law.
1. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(Altmann I), affd, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (Altmann II), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
46 (2003).
2. Id. at 1193.
3. Id. at 1192 n.4.
4. Even straightforward claims involving the rights to a single work of art may
encounter complex choice of law and conflicts of law issues involving the determina-
tion and application of the appropriate statute of limitations and substantive law, and
procedural complexities involving service of process and discovery. See, e.g., United
223
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foreign nation or one of the nation's agencies and instrumentalities, a
primary hurdle is the issue of jurisdiction over the sovereign. The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 5 provides the exclusive ba-
sis for jurisdiction in United States courts over civil actions against
foreign nations and their agencies and instrumentalities. 6 Sovereign
nations traditionally have waived the jurisdiction of their courts with
regard to suits arising from actions undertaken by foreign sovereigns
and their agencies as a matter of customary international law.7 This
granting of immunity from suit by one nation to another is a matter of
international comity and grace,8 similar to the extension by nations of
diplomatic immunity, in which nations grant immunity from their
criminal laws to diplomats acting within the scope of their official
duties. 9
The United States follows the restrictive view of sovereign im-
munity, which does not automatically immunize a foreign sovereign
from suit arising from actions of the sovereign nation or its instrumen-
talities that are equated with the actions of "private" parties, as op-
posed to "public" actions of a sovereign.10 Within that definition of
"private" conduct are actions involving the taking of property in viola-
States v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Wally 1); United
States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (MBM), 2000 WL 1890403 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 28, 2000) (Wally II); United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940
(MBM), 2002 WL 553532 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002) (Wally I11).
5. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1602-1611 (2000)).
6. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443
(1989). The FSIA amended Title 28 of the United States Code, removing the portion
of § 1332(a) which had granted federal courts diversity jurisdiction over claims in-
volving citizens of a state and a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000). The new
provision, § 1330(a), provides for "original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . ." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a) (2000). Section 1332(a)(4) of Title 28 still provides jurisdiction over a suit
in which a foreign state is a plaintiff against citizens of a state or of different states in
which the amount in controversy requirement is met. The FSIA also amended the
removal jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, to provide for removal to federal court
of actions brought against foreign states in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2000).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 451-455, § 464 (1987) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT). "The immunity of a
state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an undisputed principle of
customary international law." Id. at pt. IV, ch. 5, subch. A, introductory note.
8. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1663 (2003); Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
9. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 464.
10. Id. § 451 cmt. a; 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3662 (3d ed. 1998).
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tion of international law I or actions that amount to commercial deal-
ings, such as buying, selling and lending, that are equivalent to the
commercial activity of private parties.12 The restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity has been practiced by a number of sovereign nations
since the early part of the twentieth century,' 3 but some uncertainty
exists as to when the United States first officially announced its adher-
ence to the restrictive doctrine. Many courts and scholars have traced
the official adoption to what has come to be called the Tate Letter,
which was written in 1952.14 In fact, there is a fundamental miscon-
ception in the present jurisprudence of certain United States courts
that the Tate Letter effected a complete turnabout from a system of
absolute sovereign immunity to one of restrictive sovereign immu-
nity.' 5 This reading of the Tate Letter, however, simply is unsup-
ported by the cases.
It is my position that the principles of the restrictive theory were
adopted and applied by United States courts early in the nineteenth
century, starting with three landmark decisions of the Marshall
Court,1 6 and that only for a brief period from 1926 to 1938 did the
United States Supreme Court send a mixed message concerning the
absolute theory of sovereign immunity that contrasted with the more
restrictive message being espoused by the State Department and exec-
utive branch during the same period.
Currently, courts are addressing the question of the propriety of
the exercise of jurisdiction under the FSIA for claims arising from war
crimes that arose prior to the effective date of the statute, January 1,
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000). The rationale for treating acquisitions of prop-
erty that violate international law as private acts is the legal presumption that sover-
eign nations follow customary and conventional international law as a matter of
course. See West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987).
Therefore, when a state has engaged in conduct that violates these principles, it is
regarded as not having behaved in the manner of a sovereign, and thus is not entitled
to the privileges afforded to sovereign nations. Id.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000).
13. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, pt. IV, ch. 5, subch. A, introductory note.
14. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Philip
B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 23,
1952, at 984-85 [hereinafter Tate Letter of 1952].
15. See, e.g., Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
("Prior to 1952, the courts of the United States generally followed the doctrine of
'absolute immunity' . . . that is, the courts almost always held a foreign sovereign
immune from suit ... In 1952 the United States adopted the doctrine of 'restrictive
immunity,' as set out in the Tate Letter and later codified in the FSIA." (internal
citations omitted)).
16. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); The
Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822); Bank of the United States v.
Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
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1977, and prior to the Tate Letter in 1952.17 Part of what is at stake is
jurisdiction over wartime plunder and expropriation claims arising
from the conduct of the German belligerent forces and their agents and
instrumentalities during the Holocaust and in World War II that vio-
lated international law. Claims have been brought in United States
courts for recovery of stolen art work18 as well as confiscated real and
personal property.19
There is a circuit split among the United States Courts of Appeals
regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under the FSIA for claims aris-
ing prior to 1952, several of which involve World War H-era war
crimes. 20 The lines are drawn around four issues regarding the appli-
cation of the FSIA: (1) whether the FSIA is a jurisdictional statute,
allocating or affirming the power of courts to hear certain cases with-
out regard to whether the conduct, causes of action, and substantive
defenses to the action arose prior to its effective date or prior to 1952;
(2) whether the FSIA is a procedural statute that applies to actions
arising from operative facts that occurred before the effective date of
the statute and before 1952 because it does not affect antecedent rights
of the parties and thus is not retroactive; (3) if the application of the
FSIA to pre-enactment conduct or to conduct predating the 1952 an-
nouncement of the United States' adherence to the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity does in fact affect substantive rights of state par-
ties, namely rights to sovereign immunity under U.S. law, whether the
retroactive application of the statute was clearly indicated and in-
tended by Congress based on the language and design of the FSIA;
and (4) whether the conduct of the Nazi regime and its agencies and
17. See sources cited infra notes 18 & 20. The most comprehensive treatment of
the issue of retroactive application of the FSIA to pre-1952 conduct is Adam K.A.
Mortara, Comment, The Case Against Retroactive Application of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 253 (2001).
18. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (Alt-
mann I), aff'd, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (Altmann 11), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 46
(2003).
19. Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Pol.), 68 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D.
I11. 1999), aff'd, 215 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified by
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
20. Compare Altmann 11, 317 F.3d 954 (finding that jurisdiction over World War H
expropriation claims is appropriate under FSIA), and Haven, 215 F.3d 727 (same),
with Joo, 332 F.3d 679 (holding that jurisdiction over "comfort women's" claims
from era of Japanese aggression, 1931-45, is inappropriate under FSIA), and Carl
Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988)
(finding that jurisdiction over claims arising from 1916 bond issuance is inappropriate
under FSIA), and Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (1 1th Cir.
1986) (finding that jurisdiction over claims arising from 1911 bond issuance is inap-
propriate under FSIA).
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instrumentalities in World War II should have defeated the expecta-
tions of these state parties that they would receive immunity from
prosecution in foreign courts, thus refuting the claim that retroactive
application of the FSIA actually violates substantive rights under cus-
tomary international law.
This article addresses each of these issues regarding the applica-
tion of jurisdiction under the FSIA to World War II and other pre-
1952 war crimes, including claims involving expropriation and plun-
der of personal property, and concludes that none of these issues pre-
vents the exercise of jurisdiction under the FSIA for resolution of
these claims in United States courts. Part II discusses the history of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States prior to the
enactment of the FSIA, with particular reference to the development
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Part III discusses the
structure and purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
the expropriation exception. Part IV discusses whether the FSIA is a
jurisdictional statute. Part V discusses whether the FSIA is a procedu-
ral statute that applies to pre-effective date and pre-1952 conduct
without affecting the antecedent rights of the parties. Part VI consid-
ers whether the retroactive application of the statute was clearly indi-
cated and intended by Congress, if in fact the application of the FSIA
to pre-enactment conduct or to pre-1952 conduct does affect substan-
tive rights of state parties to sovereign immunity under U.S. law. Part
VII discusses whether nations implicated in World War II-era war
crimes should have expected immunity from prosecution in foreign
courts, thus further refuting the claim that retroactive application of
the FSIA actually violates substantive rights under customary interna-
tional law.
II.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Examining the early development of foreign sovereign immunity
law in the United States reveals that the watershed opinions of the
Marshall Court established a much more restrictive view of sovereign
immunity than recent court decisions would indicate. Courts routinely
trace the origin of foreign sovereign immunity to The Schooner Ex-
change,21 but mistakenly believe that this 1812 case inaugurated a re-
gime of absolute immunity, when in truth the Marshall Court's view
was more attuned to a restrictive theory. In fact, except for a brief
period from 1926 to 1938, the history of cases from the Marshall
21. 11 U.s. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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Court to the Tate Letter demonstrates that absolute immunity was not
afforded to every foreign sovereign, and especially not to unfriendly
foreign sovereigns.
The misconception of the American doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity begins with Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in The
Schooner Exchange. It is widely agreed that The Schooner Exchange
opinion set down the basic principles that were carried through to the
Tate Letter and the FSIA.22 However, the view that Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion had created an American doctrine of absolute sov-
ereign immunity is a misinterpretation. In fact, The Schooner Ex-
change is quite limited in its holding, and reflects a fairly modem and
restrictive view of sovereign immunity-much more modem and re-
strictive than the absolute immunity theory improperly attributed to
the case by modem authorities.
The sections that follow discuss the history leading up to The
Schooner Exchange, which also demonstrates a restrictive view of im-
munity, and the other two cases of the Marshall Court, Santissima
Trinidad23 and Planters' Bank,2 4 that complete the nineteenth century
restrictive doctrine of immunity laid down by the Marshall Court. As
will be seen, the proponents of an application of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act to conduct predating the Tate Letter may rely on
Chief Justice Marshall for the following propositions: (1) that foreign
sovereign immunity in the United States has been limited from the
start, as Chief Justice Marshall's explanation of the distinctions to be
drawn between private conduct and public conduct is much more at-
tuned to the restrictive view of sovereign immunity than the absolute
view; (2) that sovereign immunity is a privilege afforded to foreign
states as matter of comity, not a right possessed by the foreign sover-
eign; (3) that sovereign immunity is not afforded to hostile nations to
the same degree as it is afforded to friendly nations; (4) that the expec-
tations of such a right are affected by customary international law de-
fined by common usage (state practice) and by common opinion
growing out of that usage (opiniojuris); and (5) that the privilege may
be removed by the territorial sovereign simply by giving notice that it
will exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.
22. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.G-H.
23. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822).
24. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904
(1824).
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A. Sovereign Immunity in the United States Prior to
The Schooner Exchange
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was recognized and applied
by United States courts from the very beginning of the republic. As
early as 1781, the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania recognized the
doctrine that a court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over an
action involving a vessel owned by and operated in the service of a
foreign nation.25 In the beginning, the courts recognized that the doc-
trine was not absolute. 26 In fact, in 1798, a federal court held that a
ship engaged in the commercial enterprise of "prize hunting" under
the grant of a letter of marque of a foreign sovereign was subject to
suit in United States courts because its activity was private and com-
mercial, unlike that of a true warship in direct service of a sovereign
nation.2
7
The citizens of the new republic looked with suspicion on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, associating it with other abuses and
injustices of the Crown from which they had just fought to gain their
independence. 28 In the colonies, belief in the immunity of the sover-
eign was by no means universal. 29 Many colonies disclaimed sover-
eign immunity in their charters, and none included a general grant of
sovereign immunity in its constitution upon winning independence
from England in 1776.30
25. Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F. Cas. 574 (Adm. Pa. 1781) (No. 9,697).
26. See David J. Bederman, Admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment, 72 NoTE
DAME L. REV. 935, 940 (1997). American lawyers and jurists at the start of the re-
public can be expected to have been steeped in the English common law tradition,
which did not afford the Crown absolute protection from suit. Id. at 939-40. While it
had been widely recognized that the King could not be sued in his own courts, includ-
ing the High Court of Admiralty in London, this was largely modified by the Petition
of Right and monstrans de droit, forms of action which permitted proceedings against
the Crown. Id. at 939. Certain kinds of admiralty proceedings could be brought
against the Crown in the High Court of Admiralty, most notably prize cases in which
the court considered the propriety, under international law, of the capture of enemy
vessels or cargo. Id. at 939-40.
27. Ellison v. The Bellona, 8 F. Cas. 559 (D.S.C. 1798) (No. 4,407).
28. Bederman, supra note 26, at 940. My discussion here is a fairly simplistic
summary of a complicated history. For a much more thorough discussion of this
history, see James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction
in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REv. 555, 578-87 (1994); Peter J. Smith, States as
Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 28-36 (2003).
29. Bederman, supra note 26, at 940 (quoting Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 89 (1989)). See also
Doyle Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV.
207, 209 (1968); Pfander, supra note 28, at 578-80; Smith, supra note 28, at 28-36.
30. Bederman, supra note 26, at 940; Massey, supra note 29, at 89.
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B. The Schooner Exchange Case
In 1812, Chief Justice John Marshall crafted the American doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don,31 which was the starting point of foreign sovereign immunity
analyses in United States courts. The Schooner Exchange arose from
the seizure and attachment of a public vessel of war in the service of
Napoleon, who was then Emperor of France and King of Italy.32 Ap-
parently, the French had previously seized the American-owned ship,
the Schooner Exchange, in the French-controlled Spanish port of St.
Sebastians and expropriated and outfitted it as a war vessel in the ser-
vice of the French sovereign. 33 When weather and distress forced the
ship to call at Philadelphia, its original American owners libeled it and
caused an attachment to issue against it.
34
The litigants characterized the ship as a vessel of war in direct
service of the French sovereign, rather than one engaged in commerce
or trade.35 The report of the case specifically notes the allegation that
the ship "did not come to trade. There was no implied waiver of the
peculiar immunities of a public vessel," 36 indicating the perception of
the litigants and the United States Attorney 37 for the District of Penn-
sylvania (acting on behalf of the executive branch to convey a "sug-
gestion" regarding the status of the vessel) that engaging in private,
commercial activity would affect the ship's immunity from jurisdic-
tion and court process.
The United States Attorney, arguing in favor of relinquishing ju-
risdiction over the vessel, stated:
We do not.., deny the right of a nation to change the public law as
to foreign nations, upon giving notice. We may forbid the entrance
of their public ships, and punish the breach of this prohibition by
forfeiture, nor do we deny the obligation of a foreign sovereign to
conform to pre-existing laws, as to offences-and as to the acquisi-
tion of property; nor his liability for his private debts and contracts.
So if a sovereign descend from the throne and become a merchant,
he submits to the laws of the country. If he contract private debts,
31. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 123 (1812).
32. Id. at 117-18.
33. Id. at 117.
34. Id. at 118.
35. Id. at 122.
36. Id.
37. Mr. A.J. Dallas's actual title was Attorney of the United States, for the District
of Pennsylvania. See id. at 117-18. This article uses the now-equivalent term
"United States Attorney" for the convenience of modem readers.
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his private funds are liable. So if he charter a vessel, the cargo is
liable for the freight.
38
The government's attorney's delineation of the boundaries of
sovereign immunity sounds startlingly modern, as it appears virtually
identical to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the twenti-
eth century. 39 His argument first reflects the modem understanding
that state practice defines customary international law and that a state
may change the law by giving notice of its intent to pursue a different
course.40 Similarly, he asserts that a foreign sovereign engaged in pri-
vate acts-criminal offenses, the purchasing and ownership of prop-
erty, trade and commerce, and entry into private debts and contracts-
is amenable to the proscription and enforcement of a territorial sover-
eign's laws.4' The theory asserted here is one of implied consent and
submission to the laws of the territorial sovereign. The United States
Attorney continued:
Such consent is implied where the municipal law, previously pro-
vides and changes the law of nations-where it regulates trade-
where it defines and punishes crimes, and where it fixes the tenure
of property real or personal. But it cannot be implied where the
law of nations is unchanged-nor where the implication is destruc-
tive of the independence, the equality, and dignity of the
sovereign ....
There is then no municipal law, nor any practical construction by
the executive, the legislative, or the judicial department of our gov-
ernment, which authorizes the jurisdiction now claimed, we can
only have recourse to the law of nations to try the validity of that
claim. That law requires the consent of the sovereign, either ex-
press or implied, before he can be subjected to a foreign jurisdic-
tion. There is no express assent of a foreign sovereign to the
jurisdiction over his prerogative. The distinction is between his pri-
vate acts, and his acts as sovereign, and between his private and his
public property.42
This argument distinguishes between private and public conduct
and, likewise, the proper exercise of jurisdiction over vessels engaged
38. Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
39. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 451 cmt. a.
40. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 123.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 123, 125 (citations omitted). The United States Attorney laid out three
specific areas where implied consent to jurisdiction existed under customary interna-
tional law: (1) trade; (2) acquisition of real or personal property in the territory of the
other state; and (3) offenses against the laws of the territorial state. Jurisdiction, how-
ever, does not apply to the person of the sovereign himself, to his ambassador, or to
his armies and navies passing through the territory of the other state. See id. at 125.
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in private activities for a foreign state and improper exercise of juris-
diction over public vessels-in this case, a warship-of a foreign sov-
ereign,43 a principle already recognized by United States courts in the
eighteenth century cases of The South Carolina and The Bellona.
44
The U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General further emphasized
that because the United States and France enjoyed a state of peace and
amity,45 it would prove desirous not to embarrass the independence,
equality, and dignity of the foreign sovereign by dragging it before a
municipal tribunal. 46 Though this "embarrassment" factor received
little emphasis in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, 47 later courts inter-
preted it as a public policy justification for courts to abstain from ju-
risdiction so as not to embarrass the political branches of the United
States, and in particular the State Department, in the conduct of for-
eign policy.48
The U.S. Attorney General's argument asserted that the exercise
of jurisdiction raised a non-justiciable political question, beyond the
Constitution's grant of jurisdiction over suits between a "State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. ' 49 He
argued:
When wrongs are inflicted by one nation upon another, in tempes-
tuous times, they cannot be redressed by the judicial department.
... The right to demand redress belongs to the executive depart-
43. Id. at 123.
44. See Ellison v. The Bellona, 8 F. Cas. 559, 559 (D.S.C. 1798) (No. 4,407);
Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F. Cas. 574, 574 (Adm. Pa. 1781) (No. 9,697).
45. The rights of a belligerent nation to sovereign immunity are quite different. In
fact, throughout much of the United States history, courts applied the doctrine that the
government may seize the property of a foreign belligerent or that of a domestic entity
in rebellion without compensation, and the courts are without jurisdiction to review
such actions. See Deutsch-Australische Dampfschiffs Gesellschaft v. United States,
59 Ct. Cl. 450 (1924); Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558, 573-74 (1911); Ribas y
Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 323 (1903); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268,
268-69 (1870).
46. The Schooner Exchange, II U.S. (7 Cranch) at 131-32, 134 (1812).
47. See id. at 146.
48. See, e.g., Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361
(1954); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1944).
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
132. The Attorney General's political question argument would later be embodied in
the act of state doctrine, regarding the justiciability of the acts of foreign sovereigns.
This doctrine differs from the concept of sovereign immunity in that sovereign immu-
nity concerns jurisdiction over the person or property of a foreign sovereign and
power over the subject matter of a dispute that involves a foreign sovereign as a party.
See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1972)
(plurality opinion). Regarding the act of state doctrine in U.S. courts, see generally
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hemandez,
168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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ment, which alone represents the sovereignty of the nation in its
intercourse with other nations.
The simple fact in this case is, that an individual is seeking, in the
ordinary course of justice, redress against the act of a foreign sover-
eign. But the rights of a foreign sovereign cannot be submitted to a
judicial tribunal....
We claim for this vessel, an immunity from the ordinary jurisdic-
tion, as extensive as that of an ambassador, or of the Sovereign
himself; but no further. If she attempt violence, she may be
restrained.
The constitution of the United States decides nothing; it only pro-
vides a tribunal, if a case can by possibility exist....
Sovereigns are equal. It is the duty of a sovereign, not to submit
his rights to the decision of a co-sovereign. He is the sole arbiter of
his own rights. He acknowledges no superior, but God alone. To
his equals, he shows respect, but not submission.
This vessel is not the ordinary property of a sovereign.-It is his
national property-a public ship of war duly commissioned. There
is no difference in principle between such a vessel, and an army
passing through the territory. She has the same rights. She has
your permission to pass, and you are bound to give her all neces-
sary immunities.
50
In response to these arguments, Chief Justice Marshall followed
the U.S. Attorney's line of thought and decided the case on jurisdic-
tional grounds, stating:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by
the nation as an independent sovereign power.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation, not im-
posed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.
51
Chief Justice Marshall reviewed the tenets of customary interna-
tional law that called upon states to relax their own territorial jurisdic-
tion in dealings with foreign states as matter of comity, grace and
good offices:
50. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 132-33, 134.
51. Id. at 136.
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The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is pro-
moted by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of
those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require,
all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases
under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete
jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty
confers.
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attri-
bute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-
territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns
nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no
respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the
highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by plac-
ing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another,
can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express
license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and
this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an
interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a
class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to wave [sic]
the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdic-
tion, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.
52
Chief Justice Marshall also reviewed three settled instances in the
law where the sovereign nature of the defendant led to a withholding
of jurisdiction: (1) the exemption of the person of the sovereign from
arrest or detention within a foreign territory; (2) the immunity of am-
bassadors and foreign ministers; and (3) the territorial sovereign al-
lowing foreign troops to pass through his dominions.5 3 Marshall
found the problem in the case at hand-exercise of in rem jurisdiction
over a foreign warship alleged originally to have been United States
citizens' private property-to be much more vexing. He first consid-
ered the argument that the situation paralleled that of an ambassador
who has committed crimes and thereby subjected himself to the juris-
diction of the territorial sovereign, but did not find the argument
dispositive:
In what cases a minister, by infracting the laws of the country in
which he resides, may subject himself to other punishment than
52. Id. at 136-37.
53. Id. at 137-39.
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will be inflicted by his own sovereign, is an inquiry foreign to the
present purpose. If his crimes be such as to render him amenable to
the local jurisdiction, it must be because they forfeit the privileges
annexed to his character; and the minister, by violating the condi-
tions under which he was received as the representative of a foreign
sovereign, has surrendered the immunities granted on those condi-
tions; or, according to the true meaning of the original assent, has
ceased to be entitled to them.
54
Chief Justice Marshall then considered the situation of a territo-
rial sovereign who allows armies to traverse his territory, and the cus-
tomary and conventional international law rules regarding ships'
taking refuge from distress in ports of a territorial sovereign. 5 5 Fi-
nally, Marshall reached the narrow conclusion that where a nation has
allowed its ports to be open to private and public ships of a friendly
foreign sovereign, there exists a jurisdictional distinction between
ships on private business and those in public service to the sovereign:
To the Court, it appears, that where, without treaty, the ports of a
nation are open to the private and public ships of a friendly power,
whose subjects have also liberty without special license, to enter
the country for business or amusement, a clear distinction is to be
drawn between the rights accorded to private individuals or private
trading vessels, and those accorded to public armed ships which
constitute a part of the military force of the nation.
The preceding reasoning, has maintained the propositions that all
exemptions from territorial jurisdiction, must be derived from the
consent of the sovereign of the territory, that this consent may be
implied or expressed, and that when implied, its extent must be
regulated by the nature of the case, and the views under which the
parties requiring and conceding it must be supposed to act.
When private individuals . .. or when merchant vessels enter for
the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dan-
gerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infrac-
tion, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were
not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign
sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption.... Conse-
quently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of
this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they
are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license,
54. Id. at 139. The acknowledgement that the diplomatic immunity of ambassa-
dors, though recognized by "all civilized nations," is not absolute is noteworthy, as it
provides a light for the proper interpretation of the holding of the case. Id. at 138.
55. Id. at 139-41.
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therefore, under which they enter can never be construed to grant
such exemption.
But in all respects different is the situation of a public armed ship.
She constitutes a part of the military force of her nation, acts under
the immediate and direct command of the sovereign, is employed
by him in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for
preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference of
a foreign state. Such interference cannot take place without affect-
ing his power and his dignity. The implied license therefore under
which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be con-
strued, and it seems to the Court, ought to be construed, as contain-
ing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within
whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality.
56
The Court's explanation, in dicta, of the difference between a
sovereign's private property and public property engaged in the ser-
vice of the foreign state further narrowed this holding:
[It may safely be affirmed, that there is a manifest distinction be-
tween the private property of the person who happens to be a
prince, and that military force which supports the sovereign power,
and maintains the dignity and the independence of a nation. A
prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may pos-
sibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial ju-
risdiction, he may be considered as so far laying down the prince,
and assuming the character of a private individual, but this he can-
not be presumed to do with respect to any portion of that armed
force, which upholds his crown, and the nation he is entrusted to
govern.
57
As mentioned above, Chief Justice Marshall did not follow the
U.S. Attorney General's line of thought, and instead chose to resolve
the question as a jurisdictional issue under the law of sovereign immu-
nity rather than a justiciability issue or political question issue under
the developing doctrine regarding acts of state:
The arguments in favor of this opinion which have been drawn
from the general inability of the judicial power to enforce its deci-
sions in cases of this description, from the consideration, that the
sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs
committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs
give birth are rather questions of policy than of law, that they are
for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion, are of great weight, and
merit serious attention. But the argument has already been drawn
56. Id. at 143-44.
57. Id. at 145.
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to a length, which forbids a particular examination of these
points.
58
More importantly for the consideration of the issue of retroactiv-
ity, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that a territorial sovereign's
withdrawal of jurisdiction over actions involving a foreign sovereign
was a matter of comity and good offices extended to a fellow sover-
eign, not an inherent right of the foreign sovereign to such immu-
nity.59 Furthermore, Marshall emphasized that the assumption of a
foreign sovereign that it will be free from the harassment of suit in a
foreign nation can be rebutted by the territorial sovereign by giving
notice and acting to exercise jurisdiction, because such notice and
state practice redefines customary international law:
This consent may, in some instances, be tested by common usage,
and by common opinion, growing out of that usage.
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although
that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly
and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a
manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the
civilized world.
Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying
this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by
employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary
tribunals. But until such power be exerted in a manner not to be
misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having im-
parted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a
breach of faith to exercise.
60
One of the last gestures of the Court in The Schooner Exchange
was to pay regard to the practice of the executive branch of the federal
government, acting through its attorney, to provide "suggestions" to
the court regarding the sovereign status of the property or the foreign
sovereign itself at issue in the case. 61 This would prove to be a fateful
invitation, as the doctrine developed wherein the Supreme Court al-
lowed courts to exercise jurisdiction over property alleged to be the
58. Id. at 146.
59. See, e.g., id. at 143 ("[AIll exemptions from territorial jurisdiction, must be
derived from the consent of the sovereign of the territory; that this consent may be
implied or expressed, and that when implied, its extent must be regulated by the na-
ture of the case, and the views under which the parties requiring and conceding it,
must be supposed to act.").
60. Id. at 136-37, 146.
61. Id. at 147 ("If this opinion be correct, there seems to be a necessity for admit-
ting that the fact might be disclosed to the Court by the suggestion of the Attorney for
the United States.").
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property of and within the sovereignty of a foreign power, if the
United States Attorney acting on behalf of the executive branch re-
fused to give a suggestion regarding the sovereignty of the nation or
the immunity of the property, or was silent on the matter.
62
C. The Santissima Trinidad Case
Jurists and scholars frequently cite The Schooner Exchange as
the watershed case on foreign sovereign immunity, but The Santissima
Trinidad,63 a Supreme Court case that appeared just ten years later,
deserves as much attention. The Santissima Trinidad opinion, written
by Justice Story (while Chief Justice Marshall still served on the
Court), is as obscure as The Schooner Exchange case is famous. Like
The Schooner Exchange, the case arose in the admiralty context of the
arrest of a foreign vessel, but in this case, the dispute was over a
"prize" claimed by litigants from opposite sides of the Spanish colo-
nial war of independence. 64 The consul of Spain alleged that two
Spanish ships, the Santissima Trinidad and the St. Ander, had been
pirated of their contents by two armed vessels, the Independencia del
Sud and the Altravida.65 In reply, the master of the Independencia,
James Chaytor, claimed that his ships were warships of the United
Provinces of Rio de la Plata, the colonies in rebellion against Spain,
and that he relieved the two Spanish ships of their cargo as a lawful
prize under the laws of war.66 Among other objections to the Court's
jurisdiction, the respondent objected to the Court's exercise of juris-
diction over the action because it involved the actions of a public ship
of war, the Independencia del Sud.67 That the ship was a publicly
owned and operated warship was not questioned by the Court, and the
Court agreed that in rem jurisdiction over the foreign warship itself
62. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
63. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822).
64. Id. at 284-85.
65. Id.
66. The case recounts the colorful history of the master, James Chaytor of Balti-
more (also known as Don Diego Chaytor of Buenos Ayres [sic]), and his crew. Id. at
284-86. They had arranged for the American-owned ship, the Mammoth, to be outfit-
ted and to set sail to Buenos Aires, where ownership of the vessel was transferred to
the purported government of the rebellious colonies, alternatively referred to as the
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata or Buenos Ayres. Id. at 286-87. There, Chaytor
attempted to swear off his United States citizenship and assume citizenship and a
military commission in the government of Buenos Aires. Id. at 287-88. Chaytor then
set sail on a prize cruise to prey on Spanish ships. Id. at 288. One of the prizes he
claimed was the cargo of the Santissima Trinidad, and Chaytor took his cargo prize
into the port of Norfolk, Virginia for safekeeping. Id. at 285-86. There, it was at-
tached through the libel of the consul of Spain. Id. at 286.
67. Id. at 285-86.
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
[Vol. 7:223
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
would not be appropriate under The Schooner Exchange, but the Court
would not accept the extension of the argument to cover the cargo
seized by the warship as its prize. 68 It is here that the Court clarified
and extended its decision in The Schooner Exchange in ways that are
relevant to the issue of restrictive sovereign immunity.
Justice Story first clarified that customary international law lim-
ited sovereign immunity to situations in which a territorial sovereign
waives jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign's agents and instrumen-
talities who peaceably enter the territory of the territorial sovereign on
public business of the foreign sovereign, under the perception and ex-
pectation that this act would not trigger the jurisdiction of the territo-
rial sovereign's courts. 69 Justice Story noted, however, that such
immunity does not extend to the situation where the foreign sovereign
enters the jurisdiction on personal (as opposed to public) matters, be-
cause the territorial sovereign may then exercise jurisdiction over the
personal and public property of the sovereign engaged in personal
activities:
In the case of the Exchange, the grounds of the exemption of public
ships were fully discussed and expounded. It was there shown that
it was not founded upon any notion that a foreign sovereign had an
absolute right, in virtue of his sovereignty, to an exemption of his
property from the local jurisdiction of another sovereign, when it
came within his territory; for that would be to give him sovereign
power beyond the limits of his own empire. But it stands upon
principles of public comity and convenience, and arises from the
presumed consent or license of nations, that foreign public ships
coming into their ports, and demeaning themselves according to
law, and in a friendly manner, shall be exempt from the local juris-
diction. But as such consent and license is implied only from the
general usage of nations, it may be withdrawn upon notice at any
time, without just offence, and if afterwards such public ships come
into our ports, they are amenable to our laws in the same manner as
other vessels. To be sure, a foreign sovereign cannot be compelled
to appear in our Courts, or be made liable to their judgment, so long
as he remains in his own dominions, for the sovereignty of each is
bounded by territorial limits. If, however, he comes personally
within our limits, although he generally enjoy [sic] a personal im-
munity, he may become liable to judicial process in the same way,
and under the same circumstances, as the public ships of the
nation.
70
68. Id. at 351-53.
69. Id. at 336, 352-53.
70. Id. at 352-53 (citation omitted).
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The Court emphasized that nothing may compel the appearance
of a sovereign if he remains within the boundaries of his own domin-
ions, but that the presumption does not extend to personal activities of
the sovereign carried on in the territorial jurisdiction. 71 Furthermore,
the Court held that nothing in customary international law prevents a
sovereign from appearing in the courts of another nation voluntarily,
and noted that if it is deemed necessary for the sovereign to appear as
a litigant to properly defend its interests as to property found within
the territorial jurisdiction of another nation, so be it; the mere fact that
a sovereign's appearance is necessary does not deny the local court
jurisdiction:
But there is nothing in the law of nations which forbids a foreign
sovereign, either on account of the dignity of his station, or the
nature of his prerogative, from voluntarily becoming a party to a
suit in the tribunals of another country, or from asserting there any
personal, or proprietary, or sovereign rights, which may be properly
recognized and enforced by such tribunals. It is a mere matter of
his own good will and pleasure; and if he happens to hold a private
domain within another territory, it may be that he cannot obtain full
redress for any injury to it, except through the instrumentality of its
Courts of justice. It may therefore be justly laid down as a general
proposition, that all persons and property within the territorial juris-
diction of a sovereign, are amenable to the jurisdiction of himself
or his Courts: and that the exceptions to this rule are such only as
by common usage, and public policy, have been allowed, in order
to preserve the peace and harmony of nations, and to regulate their
intercourse in a manner best suited to their dignity and rights.
72
Unlike the discussion of the public versus private distinction in
The Schooner Exchange, which was arguably dicta, the discussion of
the distinction in this case was part of its holding, as the Supreme
Court allowed the District Court to maintain its jurisdiction over the
disputed prize cargo in spite of Mr. Chaytor's and United Provinces'
objections. 73 Thus, in 1822, the Supreme Court held that if a foreign
sovereign "comes personally within our limits" on business other than
that which is regarded in customary international law as the public
business of the foreign sovereign, the foreign sovereign and its prop-
erty may be amenable to the process and jurisdiction of our courts.
74
This holding again affirmed a view of sovereign immunity that is at-
tuned to the restrictive theory.
71. Id. at 353.
72. Id. at 353-54.
73. Id. at 354-55.
74. Id. at 353.
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D. The Planters' Bank Case
In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall had the opportunity to re-
state several of the principles from The Schooner Exchange and The
Santissima Trinidad. This opportunity arose in the context of a chal-
lenge to the sovereign immunity of the State of Georgia in a case
involving a partially state-owned corporation, the Planters' Bank of
Georgia.75 The owners and incorporators of the Planters' Bank, one
of whom was the State of Georgia, argued that claims concerning cer-
tain promissory notes undertaken by the bank could not be adjudicated
in court because it would compel the appearance of a sovereign
state. 76 In rejecting the claim, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes
a partner in any trading company, it devests itself, so far as con-
cerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character,
and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the
company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level
with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character
which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be
transacted.... The State of Georgia, by giving to the Bank the
capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign
character, so far as respects the transactions of the Bank, and
waives all the privileges of that character. As a member of a corpo-
ration, a government never exercises its sovereignty....
The government, by becoming a corporator, lays down its sover-
eignty, so far as respects the transactions of the corporation, and
exercises no power or privilege which is not derived from the
charter.
77
The legal separateness of a sovereign-owned entity was upheld,
along with the principle that a sovereign-owned entity that engages in
private, commercial conduct-where the sovereign steps down from
its throne to engage in trade like any other private person-will be
subject to the civil enforcement of its contracts and obligations.
78
These three cases of the 1820s, The Schooner Exchange, The
Santissima Trinidad, and Planters' Bank, present a very modem view
of sovereign immunity. Public actions of a sovereign acting in its ca-
pacity as a sovereign will enjoy the privilege of exemption from the
process and jurisdiction of suits that is afforded in customary interna-
tional law, up to the point where the territorial sovereign announces
75. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904
(1824).
76. Id. at 904-05.
77. Id. at 907-08.
78. Id.
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that the privilege is revoked. 79 A sovereign will not be compelled to
appear as a defendant in the courts of a territorial sovereign so long as
the sovereign confines its private activities to its own territory.
80
Once it extends its private, commercial activities into the territory of
another sovereign, it becomes subject to the judicial power of the
other sovereign to compel it to answer for its private activities. 81 And
sovereign-owned entities that engage in private, commercial conduct
will be required to answer for the conduct in civil proceedings just like
any other merchant or private person.
82
E. Sovereign Immunity Before and After the Pesaro Decisions
The retroactivity argument set forth most recently in Hwang
Geum Joo v. Japan8 3 requires a finding that a foreign sovereign would
have enjoyed a settled expectation of absolute immunity in the World
War II era amounting to an antecedent right that should not be re-
moved by legislation in the form of the FSIA. The argument is unsup-
ported by the cases leading up to and during World War II. These
cases establish that, except for a brief period between 1926 and 1938,
United States courts followed the recommendations of the U.S. State
Department and granted immunity to countries on good relations with
the United States and, generally speaking, for public business of the
foreign sovereign. As will be seen, the State Department espoused the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as early as 1921.84
During the brief period from 1926 to 1938, the Supreme Court
ordained that the United States followed the absolute theory of sover-
eign immunity without regard to the position taken by the State De-
partment. 85 World War II and most of the events of the Holocaust
occurred after this hiatus. During the war, the Supreme Court rein-
79. Id. at 907-08; The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353-55
(1822); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 141-43,
145-46 (1812).
80. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 907-08; The Santissima Trinidad, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 353-55; The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 141-43,
145-46.
81. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 907-08; The Santissima Trinidad, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 353-55; The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 141-43,
145-46.
82. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 907-08; The Santissima Trinidad, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 353-55; The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 141-43,
145-46.
83. 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See also Mortara, supra note 17.
84. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Pesaro II).
85. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (Pesaro III).
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forced the State Department's role in granting immunity to public
ships of friendly foreign nations.
86
In the period following the trilogy of The Schooner Exchange,
The Santissima Trinidad, and Planters' Bank, courts continued to hold
that actions involving vessels employed in the public service of a for-
eign sovereign were not amenable to suit, but the sovereign could vol-
untarily participate in litigation without affecting the courts'
jurisdiction.8 7 Few opinions addressed the concept that property of a
foreign sovereign used or employed for private purposes would not be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts where the property may be
found. In 1841, the court in Clarke v. New Jersey Steam Navigation
Company went so far as to opine, in dicta, that property of a sovereign
involved in private activities would be subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion.88 In The Pizzaro v. Matthias, the Southern District of New York,
although finding persuasive arguments in favor of an extension of The
Santissima Trinidad to allow a pre-judgment attachment of a foreign
public warship in a tort case arising from the allegedly negligent ac-
tions of the ship and her crew in American waters, ultimately declined
to make the extension. 8
9
The court in Long v. The Tampico90 was not so humble. Al-
though reaffirming the general principle that no suit in rem in admi-
ralty can be sustained, or seizure made by the marshal, under process
against property of a foreign government devoted to public uses and in
possession of an officer of the foreign government,91 the court drew a
fine distinction allowing an in rem claim when the property had not
yet been delivered into the possession of an officer of the foreign gov-
ernment.92 Thus, although the property interest and public purpose of
86. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943).
87. See e.g., The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167-68 (1870); Colombia v.
Cauca Co., 190 U.S. 524, 525-26 (1903).
88. 5 F. Cas. 974, 977 (C.C.D.R.I. 1841) (No. 2,859).
89. 19 F. Cas. 786, 788-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 11,199). The court declined to
make the extension upon deciding that it was bound by the limited holdings of The
Schooner Exchange and The Santissima Trinidad as to public warships. Id. The case
involved a collision near Staten Island between the steamship Pizzaro, owned and
operated as a warship of Italy, and the schooner Thomas Conner owned by the libel-
lant. The court considered whether an attachment of the Italian public vessel to secure
judgment might be appropriate in cases where the claimant seeks damages in tort
caused by the instrumentality of the foreign government acting within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 786-89.
90. 16 F. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
91. Id. at 496.
92. Id. at 501.
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the Mexican government in the vessels was not questioned, 93 the loca-
tion and control of the actual vessels was deemed to be of great impor-
tance.94 The court in The Attualita extended this rule and held that a
suit in rem against a vessel for damages caused by the vessel in a
collision on the high seas could be sustained even though the court
was informed during the pendency of the suit that the vessel had been
requisitioned for public use of the Italian government in World War
1.95 The court noted that the ship had not yet passed into the posses-
sion and public service of the Italian government, and rejected the
contention of the lower court in the case that attachment of the ship
would tend "to disturb the international comity existing between the
two nations, which are now friendly."
'96
The same result is found in The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24,
which upheld in rem claims for salvage services against property of
the Russian government that was destined for public use, in that the
property was not in the actual possession of an officer of the Russian
government.97 The court based its decision on an interpretation of the
law that a territorial sovereign could not be deemed to have waived
the jurisdiction of its courts with regard to foreign sovereigns in situa-
tions where such waiver is not afforded to the territorial sovereign
itself.98 The court believed that property of United States would be
subject to attachment in these circumstances:
In the absence of treaty provisions, I know of no principle which, in
a case such as this, would afford a foreign government greater im-
munity from judicial process than that which is enjoyed by our own
government. The immunity granted to friendly foreign govern-
ments rests upon international comity; but the underlying principle
upon which the immunity is granted is, nevertheless, the same in
both cases, namely, that the exercise of jurisdiction is inconsistent
with the independence of sovereign authority and public policy. 99
93. The vessels were destined to be revenue cutters of the foreign sovereign, Mex-
ico. Id. at 492.
94. Id. at 501.
95. 238 F. 909, 911 (4th Cir. 1916).
96. Id. at 911-12, 913. Note that in 1916, the United States had not entered World
War I and was not a co-belligerent of the Italian government. The State Department
had informed the court that the ship had been requisitioned by the Italian government,
but the court construed the communication to mean that the executive branch took no
position and made no formal suggestion as to proper action of the court with regard to
the issues of sovereign immunity in the case. See id. at 911.
97. 231 F. 365, 368 (D.N.J. 1916).
98. Id.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
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The cases involving the United States as sovereign to which the
Johnson Lighterage court referred largely paralleled those involving
foreign sovereigns. Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Judge for the Cir-
cuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, held in United States v.
Wilder that a lien for general average may be enforced against the
property of the sovereign that was not public property employed for a
particular public purpose. 1°0 In that case, the United States had ap-
peared voluntarily in the action to assert its claim to the property at
issue. The court in The Siren applied the same reasoning to allow a
set off in rem asserted under a salvage lien against a ship claimed as
prize by the United States.10' Once again, the sovereign had initiated
the litigation by asserting a prize claim over the vessel. This opinion
was extended by The Davis, which held that jurisdiction obtained by
an attachment in rem to enforce a salvage claim against the property
of the United States could be sustained even though it potentially
would hale the sovereign into court against its will to defend its claim
to the property, so long as the attachment of the property did not in-
volve interference with any officer or agent of the sovereign. 10 2 Al-
though the United States undeniably had a claim to the property, the
property was arrested by the marshal of the district prior to its delivery
to the United States.103 Although persuasive in their reasoning and in
their numbers, these cases do not reflect a uniform trend in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. 1°4
The 1921-26 federal cases arising from the collision of the Italian
steamship Pesaro mark another watershed in the United States law of
sovereign immunity. '0 5 The Pesaro was a merchant steamship owned
and operated by the Italian government, engaged in trade and the car-
riage of persons.'0 6 At first, the Supreme Court, Justice Van Devan-
ter, affirmed the principles that had been laid down a few weeks
100. 28 F. Cas. 601, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,694).
101. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 157-59 (1868).
102. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 19-22 (1869).
103. Id. at 22.
104. See, e.g., Briggs v. Light-Boat Upper Cedar Point, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157
(1865) (light boats owned by United States and operated for public purposes were not
subject to workmen's and materialmen's liens enforced in rem against property of
sovereign); The Fidelity, 8 F. Cas. 1189 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 4,758) (steam tug
owned by municipal corporation not liable to suit in rem in admiralty brought to
recover damages for act committed while engaged in public service); Ex parte New
York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503 (1921) (same; vessel owned by sovereign State of New
York).
105. See generally The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1921) (Pesaro 1), remanded, 277 F.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Pesaro II), rev'd sub nom Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562 (1926) (Pesaro III).
106. Pesaro 11, 277 F. at 473-74.
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before in Ex parte Muir (also written by Justice Van Devanter),10 7
holding that a claim of immunity made directly by the ambassador of
a foreign nation will not be acknowledged by the court until and un-
less the sovereign or its authorized representative makes a formal ap-
pearance in the suit as a party or proceeds through proper diplomatic
channels to cause the suggestion of immunity to come to the court
from the executive branch.10 8 Thus, the case was remanded to the
district court for further proceedings.
The case on remand was considered by Circuit Judge Mack, who
proceeded to write an exemplary dissertation on the restrictive view of
sovereign immunity. 10 9 Judge Mack reviewed the domestic case law
and surveyed as many European authorities as he could find to make
his determination that customary international law did not afford im-
munity to a sovereign owned vessel that is carrying out private, com-
mercial services for the sovereign.' 10 Judge Mack was bolstered in his
decision by the fact that the State Department, upon the court's re-
quest, had issued the following communication to the court:
It is the view of the Department that government-owned merchant
vessels or vessels under requisition of governments whose flag they
fly employed in commerce should not be regarded as entitled to the
immunities accorded public vessels of war. The Department has
not claimed immunity for American vessels of this character. In
cases of private litigation in American ports involving merchant
vessels owned by foreign governments, the Department has made it
a practice carefully to refrain from taking any action which might
constitute an interference by the authorities of this government in
such litigation.11 1
This communication from the State Department indicates its
adoption of the view that merchant ships owned and operated by a
foreign government are not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Su-
preme Court, again by Justice Van Devanter, simply rejected the rea-
soning of Judge Mack's opinion and the recommendation of the State
Department and declared that the United States follows the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity. 112 The Court held that immunity from
107. 254 U.S. 522 (1921). Ex parte Muir involved a claim of immunity asserted by
private counsel of the British government, appearing only as amici curiae in the suit,
not through entry of appearance as a suitor nor by diplomatic communication of the
claim through the State Department. The court refused to issue an extraordinary writ
to quash the jurisdiction of the lower court on the basis of this claim. Id. at 532-34.
108. Pesaro I, 255 U.S. at 218-19.
109. See generally Pesaro 1H, 277 F. 473.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 479 n.3.
112. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571-74 (1926) (Pesaro I11).
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the jurisdiction of the courts was owed to a sovereign owned merchant
vessel engaged in commercial activities.' 13 The Court held, further,
that it was inappropriate to assume that customary international law
required that trade and commerce necessarily were private activities of
a sovereign, and concluded that trade and commerce certainly might
be regarded as essential for the economic welfare of the nation, and
thus public in nature. 1 4 A vessel carrying out trade and commerce for
the benefit of the nation was as much carrying out the public purposes
of the state as a ship of war, and should be afforded the same
immunities. 115
The Pesaro III opinion did not end the debate. Although the dis-
tinction of public and private property was put on the back burner by
the Supreme Court, the lower courts shifted focus back to the execu-
tive's recommendations as to sovereign immunity.' 1 6 But for a rela-
tively brief period starting in 1926 and ending by 1938 at the latest
with the decision in Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v.
The Navemar,11 7 the Supreme Court of the United States, contrary to
the stated position of the State Department, had ordained that the
United States followed the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.
F. The Courts' Reaction to Executive Communications on Matters
of Sovereign Immunity after Pesaro III and Before 1952
Pesaro III was an aberration in a fairly consistent process of
courts following recommendations of the executive branch regarding
the immunities granted to foreign sovereigns. In fact, the courts' reli-
ance on the suggestions of the State Department regarding the sover-
eign status of the defendant and the public or sovereign nature of the
activities from which the litigation arose was one of the most notable
developments in sovereign immunity law of the mid-nineteenth to
early twentieth century. 18 By the early twentieth century, with the
exception of the Pesaro III decision, it had become clear that United
113. Id. at 574, 576.
114. Id. at 574.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199,
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
117. 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938).
118. See Hassard v. Mexico, 61 N.Y.S. 939 (App. Div. 1899), affd, 66 N.E. 1110
(N.Y. 1903) (noting that U.S. Attorney had intervened in suit to assert immunity of
Mexico, and following his recommendation); Molina v. Comision Reguladora del
Mercado de Henequen, 103 A. 397 (N.J. 1918) (holding silence of State Department
to be important to court's decision to deny claim of immunity to corporation owned
by Mexican Yucatan state). But cf. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898) (declaring that Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution gave citi-
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States courts would rely on the suggestion of the executive branch
regarding the jurisdictional immunity owed to a foreign sovereign or
its property.119 It was also clear that in the absence of such sugges-
tion, by inaction or by refusal, the courts would exercise jurisdiction to
resolve the issues of the case, leaving the foreign sovereign with the
sole option of joining the suit as a party in order to prove its claims of
sovereignty and immunity.
12 0
The Supreme Court, per Justice Stone in The Navemar, tipped
the scales in favor of judicial recognition of the recommendations of
the State Department when it stated:
If the claim is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of
the government, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel
upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General of the United
States, or other officer acting under his direction.1 21
This statement was dictum, as the State Department had refused
to state any position on the immunities to be afforded Spain in the
case, although the Spanish Ambassador had attempted to assert the
claims through an informal communication to the court, and later by
moving the Court to intervene in the suit.122 The Supreme Court went
on to approve American courts' continuance of jurisdiction over the
case until the issue of sovereign immunity could properly be
determined:
The Department of State having declined to act, the want of admi-
ralty jurisdiction because of the alleged public status of the vessel
and the right of the Spanish Government to demand possession of
the vessel as owner if it so elected, were appropriate subjects for
judicial inquiry upon proof of the matters alleged.
But the filed suggestion [of the Spanish Ambassador], though suffi-
cient as a statement of the contentions made, was not proof of its
allegations. This Court has explicitly declined to give such a sug-
gestion the force of proof or the status of a like suggestion coming
from the executive department of our government. 123
zenship to U.S.-born children of foreign nationals in spite of executive and legislative
position on their status under Chinese Exclusion Acts).
119. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74
(1938); The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924); Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S.
616, 619 (1921); Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 523-33 (1921).
120. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588; The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 74; The Gul
Djemal, 264 U.S. at 94; Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. at 619; Ex parte Muir,
254 U.S. at 532-33.
121. 303 U.S. at 74.
122. Id. at 70-71.
123. Id. at 75.
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The Court then remanded the case to allow the Spanish govern-
ment to intervene in the suit as a claimant, following the rule laid
down in Ex parte Muir and Pesaro j.124 The Court thus gave notice
that it was continuing the policy of requiring foreign states to pursue
their claims of immunity through the State Department (which might
refuse to support the claim of immunity) or by direct intervention in
the suit as a claimant.
Although after The Navemar the courts tended to follow direct
recommendations of the executive branch communicated to the courts
through the Attorney General or the local United States Attorney,
125
the nature of recommendations of the executive branch regarding im-
munities to be extended to foreign governments and the courts' reac-
tion to these suggestions were far from uniform. 126 The Second
Circuit in particular, with its large docket of admiralty cases, had sev-
eral occasions to rule on this issue after Pesaro III and The Navemar,
and apparently, it construed these two opinions to mean that courts
were free to make up their own minds as to immunity in particular
cases. 127
In his three opinions in The Navemar, Ex parte Peru, and Mexico
v. Hoffman, 128 Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone steered the federal
courts into the position that sovereign immunity was to be evaluated
with deference to the suggestions of the political branches of the gov-
ernment, 129 and in the absence of a recommendation by the political
124. Id. at 76 (citing Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921); Pesaro 1, 255 U.S. 216,
219 (1921)).
125. E.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588-89.
126. Compare Miller v. Ferrocarrill del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 18 A.2d 688 (Me.
1941) (finding that executive's mere communication of claim of foreign government
without comment is tacit indication of approval of claim, and granting immunity),
with The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916) (finding that mere communication of
immunity of Italy without stating position on the claim is not tacit approval, and refus-
ing claim of immunity), accord Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 24 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y.
1939), and Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825
(N.Y. App. Div. 1940).
127. Compare Puente v. Spanish Nat'l State, 116 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding
that court could take judicial notice of immune status of defendant in spite of execu-
tive silence on issue), with Sullivan v. Sdo Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941) (find-
ing that executive's communication was construed as approval of claim of immunity,
but such executive position was not deemed to be conclusive of the issue), and Banco
de Espana v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) (same).
128. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
129. The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 74 ("If the claim is recognized and allowed by the
executive branch of the government, it is then the duty of the courts to release the
vessel upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General .. "); Ex parte Peru,
318 U.S. at 589 ('This practice is founded upon the policy . . . that our national
interest will be better served... if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with a
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branch, as determined by the courts based on their own understanding
of the United States' practice of sovereign immunity.1 30 The culmina-
tion of the process, as stated in Hoffman, was the following interpreta-
tion of the law:
In the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the politi-
cal branch of the government, the courts may decide for themselves
whether all the requisites of immunity exist. That is to say, it is for
them to decide whether the vessel when seized was that of a foreign
government and was of a character and operated under conditions
entitling it to the immunity in conformity to the principles accepted
by the department of the government charged with the conduct of
our foreign relations. 1
31
Chief Justice Stone's policy was to defer to the political
branches, particularly the executive branch, as it is charged with the
conduct of international relations, and to avoid "embarrassment" of
the executive branch either by granting jurisdiction over foreign sover-
eigns where the executive has chosen to waive it, or by denying juris-
diction over foreign sovereigns in circumstances where the executive
branch would like to send a message by refusing to waive
jurisdiction. 
1 32
Chief Justice Stone did not tie up the issue of sovereign immunity
as a nonjusticiable political question akin to the act of state doctrine.
He set it down as an issue of deferring to the executive branch of
government when its position is clear, and determining what the
proper position of the government should be when the executive
branch is silent. He thus quietly overruled Pesaro III, which had ig-
nored the stated position of the executive branch on immunities to be
given to state-owned vehicles that were operated for commercial pur-
poses. 133 This fact is driven home by the holding of the case: that a
steamship owned by the government of Mexico but possessed and op-
erated under a charter by private parties engaged in trade and com-
merce was not entitled to sovereign immunity protection. 34
friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the
compulsions of judicial proceedings.").
130. The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 75 ("The Department of State having declined to act,
the want of... jurisdiction because of the alleged public status of the vessel... [was
an] appropriate subject[ ] for judicial inquiry upon proof of the matters alleged.").
131. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34-35 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 35-36.
133. Id. at 35 n.1. The overruling of the case was so quiet and respectful that Justice
Frankfurter felt compelled to highlight with approval the Court's retreat from the prin-
ciples of Pesaro III in his concurring opinion, joined by Justice Black. Id. at 39
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 33, 38.
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Such was the nature of the political process, that changing diplo-
matic relationships and changing political administrations often led to
various and, at times, inconsistent outcomes. However, this variety of
results, although not entirely predictable, was consistent with United
States courts' overall interpretation of sovereign immunity, because
sovereign immunity had historically been justified by political consid-
erations in international relations, and not as a recognition of the rights
of foreign sovereigns. 135 Thus, politics and international policy would
call for the extension of comity and grace in the form of the recogni-
tion of sovereign immunity in certain situations, but not in others. If
anything was made known to the community of nations by the courts
of the United States "in a manner not to be misunderstood,"' 36 it was
this fact.
G. State Department Communications on Sovereign Immunity
Regarding State-Sponsored Plunder
and Other "Private" Acts
The State Department's policy regarding immunity for private
acts followed a fairly consistent path in the twentieth century. As
noted in Pesaro H, as of 1921, the State Department accepted the fun-
damentals of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
137
In cases where it appeared that a vessel was possessed and oper-
ated by a foreign government directly, and where extension of the im-
munity would serve its ends, the State Department tended to make a
direct suggestion of immunity. 38 In cases where the circumstances
did not indicate that the foreign sovereign directly possessed and oper-
ated a vessel, or where extension of immunity would not serve its
purposes, the State Department tended not to take a position in the
matter. 139 This was also true in cases where the foreign sovereign was
135. See, e.g., Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro,
271 U.S. 526, 571-73 (1926) (Pesaro III); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822); The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146
(1812).
136. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
137. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (quoting letter from Secretary of
State to court in The Pesaro, 277 F.473, 479 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Pesaro I)).
138. E.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
139. E.g., The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 30
(1945).
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
20041
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
not considered to be "friendly," 4° or in situations where the U.S. gov-
ernment had broken off relations with the foreign sovereign.1 41
Of particular importance to the issues of retroactivity with regard
to claims arising out of the Nazi plunder of Europe during World War
II, in January 1943, the United States and seventeen of its allies issued
the "Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy-
Controlled Territory,"1 42 warning of their intent "to do their utmost to
defeat the methods of dispossession practiced by the governments
with which they are at war against the countries and peoples who have
been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled."143  The declaration
continued:
Accordingly the governments making this declaration and the
French National Committee reserve all their rights to declare inva-
lid any transfers of, or dealings with, property, rights and interests
of any description whatsoever which are, or have been, situated in
the territories which have come under the occupation or control,
direct or indirect, of the governments with which they are at war or
which belong or have belonged, to persons ... resident in such
territories. This warning applies whether such transfers or dealings
have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or of transactions
apparently legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily
effected. 144
Six years later, the State Department again announced its position
that the courts should proceed with claims for repossession of Nazi
140. On many occasions, the State Department's silence might be explained by the
unfriendly or "neutral" relations between the United States and the foreign power.
See, e.g., The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (concerning claim made by Spain during Spanish
Civil War between Loyalist forces and fascist Nationalist forces under Franco, and
United States' adoption of position of neutrality during conflict).
141. Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616, 619 (1921); The Gul Djemal, 264
U.S. 90, 91-94 (1924). These cases involved the extension of immunity to the Otto-
man Empire in Turkey with whom the United States had broken off relations during
the time period relevant to the actions. The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. at 91. The U.S.
State Department refused to offer a suggestion in support of immunity, and Turkey
had attempted to assert a defense of immunity through the appearance of the captain
of the vessel, Mr. Hussein Lufti Bey. Id. The Supreme Court, although recognizing
that the vessel was owned and operated by the Turkish Government, and noting that
Turkey, at the time of suit, was not hostile to the United States, nevertheless on two
occasions refused to entertain the claim to immunity through the petition of the cap-
tain of the ship, and permitted the lower court to entertain jurisdiction over the suit in
the absence of a properly asserted suggestion of immunity. Id. at 94-95.
142. DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 9, 1943, at 21-22.
143. Id. at 21.
144. Id. at 21-22.
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plundered property in a press release published on April 27, 1949.14 5
The State Department press release stated, in pertinent part:
As a matter of general interest, the Department publishes herewith
a copy of a letter of April 13, 1949 from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Advisor, Department of State, to the Attorneys for the plaintiff in
Civil Action No. 31-555 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
The letter repeats this Government's opposition to forcible acts of
dispossession of a discriminatory and confiscatory nature practiced
by the Germans on the countries or peoples subject to their con-
trols; states that it is this Government's policy to undo the forced
transfers and restitute identifiable property to the victims of Nazi
persecution wrongfully deprived of such property; and sets forth
that the policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in
the United States for restitution of such property, is to relieve
American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their juris-
diction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials. 146
The letter from Mr. Tate is then quoted in pertinent part:
1. This Government has consistently opposed the forcible acts of
dispossession of a discriminatory and confiscatory nature practiced
by the Germans on the countries or people subject to their controls.
3. The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in
the United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or
compensation in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress
as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve American
courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials. 147
The post-war situation with Japan was different. As pointed out
by the D.C. Circuit in Joo v. Japan, the 1951 Treaty of Peace between
Japan and the Allied powers explicitly waived "all ... claims of the
Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by
Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war" in
return for a reciprocal waiver of claims by Japan and the right of the
Allied Powers to seize Japanese assets within the Allies' respective
145. Press Release No. 296, Jurisdiction of United States Courts Re Suits for Identi-
fiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers, State Dep't (Apr. 27, 1949), re-
printed in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76
(2d Cir. 1954) [hereinafter Press Release No. 296]; see also Altmann v. Republic of
Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (Altmann I1).
146. Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376 (quoting Press Release No. 296, supra note 145).
147. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Attor-
neys for plaintiff in Civil Action No. 31-555 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Apr. 13, 1949), quoted in Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376;
see also Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 965-66.
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jurisdictions. 148 The Treaty further provided that Japan would also
resolve any war-related claims of other United Nations member states
and their nationals through intergovernmental agreements. 149 Japan
entered such agreements with China and Korea, but not with Germany
or Austria.
1 50
The State Department followed the 1949 Tate communication
with the more famous Tate Letter of 1952, which reaffirmed that the
United States had joined the sizeable list of nations that followed the
restrictive view of sovereign immunity.
151
From 1952 to 1976, the State Department's pronouncements con-
tinued to influence the immunities granted to sovereign states. 152 At
times, the Department made recommendations that appeared to be po-
litically and foreign policy motivated, subject to the diplomatic pres-
sures and influences of foreign states rather than by a strict adherence
to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.1 53 This became a mo-
tivating factor for the codification and standardization of the restric-
tive theory and for transferring the determination process from the
executive branch to the courts through legislation that became the
FSIA.
148. Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Multilateral Treaty of
Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 14, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3183).
149. Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 148, art. 26, 3 U.S.T. at
3190; Joo, 332 F.2d at 685.
150. Joo, 332 F.2d at 685 (citing Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and
Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement on the Settlement of Problems
Concerning Property and Claims on the Economic Co-operation Between Japan and
the Republic of Korea, June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 173). Although the D.C. Cir-
cuit's primary holding in Joo is that the FSIA is not a jurisdictional statute and is not
intended by Congress to operate retroactively beyond 1952, the case alternatively
holds that if the analysis in Altmann H (that the FSIA should apply to the conduct of
Nazi Germany and Austria in World War II because the State Department had given
clear indications that Germany and its affiliates would not enjoy protection from pros-
ecution) is correct, then the situation with Japan is different. Id. at 684-85.
151. Tate Letter of 1952, supra note 14.
152. E.g., Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Al-
fred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 696-97 & app. 1 at
706-11 (1976).
153. E.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1199 (2d
Cir. 1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), affid, 295
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); see Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign
States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmen-
tal Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 34-35 (1976) (testi-
mony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State); Monroe Leigh,
Sovereign Immunity-The Case of the "Imias," 68 Am. J. INT'L L. 280 (1974).
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H. Interpretation and Implementation of the Principles of
Sovereign Immunity After 1952
Decisions after the Tate Letter are important because they point
out two facts that are important to the retroactivity argument: first,
recommendations of the State Department always were made accord-
ing to the state of relations at the time of suit, not necessarily at the
time of events from which the suit arose. Second, the application of
jurisdiction over events that happened earlier has never been ques-
tioned by the courts as a potentially improper retroactive denial of
antecedent rights. The most likely explanation for this is that sover-
eign immunity has never been regarded as a "right" of foreign states.
It has always been explained as a matter of grace and comity, which
can be withdrawn simply by giving notice.
1. The Limited Doctrine of Immunity: The Distinction Between
Public and Private Actions
The Supreme Court was quick to follow up on the executive's
restatement of policy to follow the restrictive view of sovereign im-
munity. In 1955, the Court held that an action to enforce a pledge of
security by the Republic of China in 1920 and a separate pledge made
in 1947-48, arising from events that occurred well before the 1952
Tate Letter, was properly adjudicated by the federal courts.' 54 The
Court specifically noted the State Department's adherence to the re-
strictive view of sovereign immunity that was reaffirmed in the Tate
Letter, but had no qualms about applying this theory to conduct that
predated the Tate Letter.
1 55
The Tate Letter failed to lay out specific criteria for public acts of
a sovereign nation that would enjoy immunity from jurisdiction as op-
posed to private acts that would not. The Schooner Exchange, The
Santissima Trinidad and Planters' Bank trilogy of cases had sug-
gested the metaphors that "if a sovereign descend from the throne and
become a merchant," 156 "lay[s] down the prince, and assum[es] the
character of a private individual,"'' 57 or "comes personally within our
limits" 58 he would be subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the
154. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 348 U.S. at 360-65.
155. Id. at 361.
156. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 123 (1812); see
also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 696; Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S.
360, 369 (1934); Bank of the U.S. v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904,
907 (1824).
157. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145.
158. The Santissirna Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822).
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courts. But defining acts of sovereignty versus acts of a private citizen
carried on by a sovereign-even in cases involving sovereign-owned
merchant ships-proved to be troublesome. 59 The Second Circuit fil-
led the gap in Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abaste-
cimientos y Transportes,1 60 which set forth the following criteria for
public sovereign acts that would be immune from jurisdiction: (1) in-
ternal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative
acts, such as nationalization; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4)
acts concerning diplomatic activity; and (5) public loans.161 These
criteria were followed by other federal courts in the period before the
enactment of the FSIA.
162
The Court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
in a plurality opinion, applied the restrictive theory to allow claims to
recover payments made for cigar shipments after the owners of the
cigar producers had been replaced by "intervention" (expropriation)
by the Castro regime in Cuba in 1960.163 The plurality opinion specif-
ically relied on the Tate Letter,1 64 and pointed out that as of 1976,
thirteen countries followed the restrictive theory-most notably En-
gland, France, and Germany.1 6
5
Most of the Supreme Court cases on sovereign immunity since
the enactment of the FSIA have involved commercial transactions. In
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, a unanimous Court applied
the restrictive theory embodied in the FSIA to a contract action by a
Dutch corporation against the Central Bank of Nigeria for payment for
159. See P. de Paepe, De la competence civile d l'egard des Etats dtrangers et de
leurs agents politiques, diplomatiques ou consulaires, 22 JOURNAL Du DROIT INrER-
NATIONAL Ppdvt 31, 33 (1895); J.-F. Lalive, L'immunitj de jurisdiction des Etats et
des organisations internationales, 84 RECUEIL DES COURS 205, 259-60 (1953); H.
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT.
Y.B. Ir'L L. 220, 225 (1951); Preliminary Draft, Convention on the Competence of
Courts in Regard to Foreign States, in RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL 311, 386-91 (1931); Andr6 Weiss, Competence ou incompetence des
tribunaux a l'dgard des Etats etrangers, 1 RECUEIL DES COURS 525 (1923); see also,
e.g., Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d 935, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1938); The Gul Djemal, 264
U.S. 90, 94-95 (1924); Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616, 619 (1921).
160. 336 F.2d 354, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that Spain could be haled into
court for engaging in private conduct in form of entry into shipping charter agreement
with arbitration clause).
161. Id. at 360 (quoting Lalive, supra note 159, at 285-86).
162. E.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d
501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d
1198, 1200 (2d Cir. 1971).
163. 425 U.S. 682, 705-06 (1976).
164. Id. at 698, 711.
165. Id. at 702 n.15.
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cement shipments.1 66 And the Court in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., again in a unanimous opinion, held that issuance of
currency stabilization bonds was a private, commercial act of the for-
eign sovereign that did not afford it immunity from a contract action
to enforce the bonds.
167
In contrast, the practices of a sovereign nation in running a state-
owned hospital and recruiting workers and technicians in the United
States to work in that hospital were held to be private acts that did not
qualify for one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity under the
FSIA. 168 This holding was not disturbed by the fact that after recruit-
ing respondent Nelson to work at the Saudi-owned hospital, agents of
the government imprisoned and tortured him for making safety recom-
mendations concerning equipment and practices at the hospital that
were not well-received by the government.
169
There is a line of federal cases involving the Cuban expropriation
of American property after the communist takeover of Cuba under
Castro in 1960.170 These cases, however, were decided under the act
of state doctrine rather than the sovereign immunity jurisdictional doc-
trine, so they do not directly affect the issues regarding the proper
application of sovereign immunity before and after the FSIA's enact-
ment. The Supreme Court, following the Underhill doctrine17' and
relying heavily on the State Department's intentional silence in the
face of inquires concerning the foreign policy implications of the suit,
initially declared that Cuba's seizure and expropriation of property in
Cuba presented a nonjusticiable political question that could not be
166. 461 U.S. 480, 488, 497 (1983).
167. 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992).
168. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993).
169. Id. at 352-53.
170. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir.
1981); Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d
913 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l
City Bank of N.Y., 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.
1970), vacated by 400 U.S. 1019 (1971); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193
F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
171. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). This case provided the clas-
sic statement of the act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Re-
dress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252.
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reviewed by U.S. courts. 172 Later, after passage of the Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,173 and even later,
after the enactment of the FSIA and after the State Department had
issued its opinion that nothing should hinder the courts from making
determinations regarding the unlawful seizure of American property in
Cuba, the courts allowed the determination of setoff claims and coun-
terclaims against Cuban state-owned entities.' 74 It is significant to
note, however, that the Supreme Court held that the FSIA did not an-
swer the act of state issues in one case because the FSIA was a juris-
dictional provision that did not change antecedent rights of sovereign
nations. 175 In 1976, just prior to the enactment of the FSIA, only a
plurality of four Justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the Tate
Letter and the developing international and national law of sovereign
immunity removed the act of state issue from actions involving com-
mercial activities of foreign sovereigns.
1 76
2. The Nature of the Immunity: Not a Right, but a Privilege
Extended by Comity
The courts consistently have acknowledged the principle that
sovereign immunity was not a right owed to a foreign sovereign, but
merely a privilege extended by the grace of a territorial sovereign, and
that all the territorial sovereign had to do to withdraw the privilege
was to give notice to the world that it would not afford the privilege of
immunity from suit to foreign sovereigns.1 77 Unlike Eleventh
Amendment immunity, the "privileged position of a foreign state is
not an explicit command of the Constitution. It rests on considera-
tions of policy given legal sanction by [the Supreme] Court."1 78 The
Supreme Court interpreted the holding of The Schooner Exchange on
this point as follows:
172. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420, 439.
173. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000).
174. E.g., First Nat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 633-34; Chase Manhattan Bank, 658
F.2d at 884; Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 822 F.2d at 236.
175. First Nat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 620-21.
176. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 696-705
(1976) (opinion of White, J., joined by Berger, Ch. J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.).
177. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1663 (2003); Verlinden B.V. v.
Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 283, 352-53 (1822). The sovereign immunity granted to individual states of
the United States differs from that afforded to foreign nations. See Caleb Nelson,
Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1559
(2002).
178. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1955);
see also Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486; Nelson, supra note 177, at 1619.
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It was there shown that it was not founded upon any notion that a
foreign sovereign had an absolute right, in virtue of his sovereignty,
to an exemption of his property from the local jurisdiction of an-
other sovereign, when it came within his territory; for that would be
to give him sovereign power beyond the limits of his own empire.
But it stands upon principles of public comity and convenience, and
arises from the presumed consent or license of nations, that foreign
public ships coming into their ports, and demeaning themselves ac-
cording to law, and in a friendly manner, shall be exempt from the
local jurisdiction. But as such consent and license is implied only
from the general usage of nations, it may be withdrawn upon notice
at any time, without just offence, and if afterwards such public
ships come into our ports, they are amenable to our laws in the
same manner as other vessels.179
This principle is still followed today.' 80
The Supreme Court has distinguished the privilege of sovereign
immunity from status-based rights to immunity, such as legislative
immunity, judicial immunity, and presidential immunity. 81 Unlike
these status-based immunities, which provide a legal entitlement to
immunity based on one's position and the necessity not to be inhibited
in official functions by the threat of lawsuits arising from actions un-
dertaken within the scope of the office's duties, sovereign immunity is
not a right belonging to a foreign nation and its agencies and instru-
mentalities based on its status as a sovereign nation.' 82 Instead, it is
purely a matter of comity that is extended by the grace of the territo-
rial sovereign,183 and can be withdrawn or amended at any time.
179. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 352-53.
180. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486; First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27 (1983); Nat'l City Bank of N. Y.,
348 U.S. at 359. See also New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp. v. Marschalk Co., 453 U.S. 919
(1981) ("Sovereign immunity is granted to foreign governments as a matter of comity.
While it is a well-established doctrine, it is clear that it is a privilege granted by one
sovereign to another in the family of nations. It is not now nor has it ever been a right
enjoyed by one sovereign within the territorial jurisdiction of another. The fact that
the doctrine has now been codified in the [FSIA] does not alter this fundamental
premise. To be sure, sovereign immunity is a privilege enjoyed by a foreign nation
rather than an inalienable right to which it can lay claim.") (citations omitted).
181. Dole Food, 123 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in order to free the government from the case-by-case diplomatic pres-
sures, to clarify the governing standards, and to "assur[e] litigants that
S. . decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process."' 18 4 The FSIA codified into federal statutory
law the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity that was developed
and adopted by the United States in the twentieth century.1 85 In addi-
tion, the FSIA addressed the uncertainties of the Department of State's
policies 186 with regard to providing suggestions regarding a foreign
nation's sovereign immunity that seemed to fly in the face of the re-
strictive theory of immunity, 187 or by providing the cryptic statements
of "no comment," as seen in The Navemar and Sabbatino cases.
188
According to the legislative history, the statute was designed to
accomplish four objectives: (1) to codify the "restrictive" principle of
sovereign immunity adopted by the Department of State in 1952;189
(2) to insure that the restrictive principle of immunity is applied in
litigation before U.S. courts; 190 (3) to provide a statutory procedure for
effecting service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over, a
184. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6606.
185. See Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 488-89. For a detailed history of the enactment
of the FSIA, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3662, at 216.
186. See WRIGr ET AL., supra note 10, § 3662, at 216.
187. E.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974); Isbrandtsen Tankers,
Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir. 1971); Heaney v. Gov't of
Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971).
188. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68,
75-76 (1938); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 399 (1963).
189. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605 ("First, the bill would codify the so-called 'restrictive' principle of sovereign
immunity, as presently recognized in international law. Under this principle, the im-
munity of a foreign state is 'restricted' to suits involving a foreign state's public acts
(jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts
(jure gestionis). This principle was adopted by the Department of State in 1952 and
has been followed by the courts and by the executive branch ever since. Moreover, it
is regularly applied against the United States in suits against the U.S. Government in
foreign courts."). In the paragraph quoted here, the House Report repeats the popular
misconception that the 1952 Tate Letter inaugurated the American doctrine of restric-
tive immunity rather than tracing the doctrine back to the Marshall Court decisions,
and states that the doctrine was "followed by the courts and by the executive branch
ever since," which is inconsistent with the actual record. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
190. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06.
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foreign state;19' and (4) to remedy, in part, the problems faced by
plaintiffs who have obtained judgments against foreign states.1
92
The FSIA amended Title 28 of the United States Code to remove
the earlier provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) which had allowed diver-
sity jurisdiction in federal courts over claims involving citizens of a
state and a foreign state, and replaced it with the provision codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), providing for "original jurisdiction without re-
gard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a
foreign state .... ,,193 Section 1332(a)(4) of Title 28 still provides
jurisdiction over a suit in which a foreign state is a plaintiff against
citizens of a state or of different states in which the amount in contro-
versy requirement is met.194 The FSIA also amended the removal ju-
risdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), to provide for removal to
federal court of actions brought against foreign states in state court.'
95
The FSIA has, in effect, provided a federal long-arm statute in 28
U.S.C. § 1330(b) for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign
states, including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities
of foreign states. 196 If none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity
set forth in the FSIA applies, the court lacks both statutory subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. 
197
The FSIA addresses what constitutes a foreign state under the
sovereign immunity provisions:
(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section 1608 of this title,
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership inter-
est is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
and
191. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
192. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606; WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 10, § 3662, at 216.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3662, at 215.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (2000); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3662, at 215.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2000); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3662, at 215-16.
196. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3662, at 215; Verneulen v. Renault,
U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1553 (1 1th Cir. 1993); Nat'l Am. Corp. v. Fed. Republic
of Nig., 48 F. Supp. 622, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
197. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
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(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created
under the laws of any third country. 198
Section 1604 lays out the basic scheme for the allowance of im-
munity to foreign states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state
shall be immune from jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter. 199
Section 1605 then provides the exceptions to sovereign immunity
of foreign states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of
the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except
in accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a com-
mercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of interna-
tional law are in issue and that property or any property ex-
changed for such property is present in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or that property or any property ex-
changed for such property is owned or operated by an agency
or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instru-
mentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States .... 200
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (2000).
199. Id. § 1604.
200. Id. § 1605(a)(1)-(3). Section 1605(a) goes on to provide exceptions for the
following actions:
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succes-
sion or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States
are in issue;
(5) ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States....
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The expropriation exception in section 1605(a)(3) is the primary
focus of my analysis in this article. In order to establish jurisdiction
pursuant to the FSIA expropriation exception, a plaintiff must demon-
strate: "(1) that rights in property are in issue; (2) that the property was
'taken'; (3) that the taking violated international law; and (4) that one
of the two jurisdictional nexus requirements is satsified." 201 To estab-
lish the necessary jurisdictional nexus with the United States, the
property must "either (a) be present in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the for-
eign state, or (b) be owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality
of the foreign state that is engaged in a commercial activity in the
United States.
20 2
A right in property, within the meaning of the FSIA, is generally
held to be a right in "physical property" as opposed to a right to re-
ceive payments,20 3 or even an intangible property interest, such as mi-
nority share ownership in a corporation, that is not within the
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made
by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to
arbitration....
(7) ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material sup-
port or resources ... except that the court shall decline to hear a claim
under this paragraph-
(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism....
(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is
brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign
state, which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity of the
foreign state....
(d) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in any action brought to foreclose a preferred
mortgage, as defined in the Ship Mortgage Act ....
Id. § 1605(a)(4)-(7). Section 1607 provides an exception for counterclaims asserted
in suits initiated in U.S. courts by foreign sovereigns. Id. § 1607.
201. Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 251 (2d
Cir. 2000); see also Lord Day & Lord v. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 134 F. Supp.
2d 549, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
202. De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985).
203. E.g., Hirsh v. State of Israel, 962 F. Supp. 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) and Cana-
dian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that contractual rights to payment, absent expropriation of
real property, do not constitute "property" within meaning of FSIA).
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claimant's exclusive control. 20 4 Breach of a commercial contract
alone does not constitute a taking pursuant to international law.205
The term "taken" is not defined in the FSIA. According to the
legislative history, however, "taken in violation of international law"
denotes "the nationalization or expropriation of property without pay-
ment of the prompt adequate and effective compensation required by
international law."'20 6 This includes "takings which are arbitrary or
discriminatory in nature. '207 Therefore, "taken" refers not to acts of a
private enterprise, but to acts of a sovereign which deprive a plaintiff
of property without adequate compensation. 208
Courts will likely conclude that an act of expropriation violates
international law if it does not serve a public purpose, if it is discrimi-
natory, particularly against aliens on the basis of their nationality or
ethnicity, or if it is not followed by payment of just compensation. 2°9
The United States has asserted consistently that just compensation
means compensation that is "prompt, adequate and effective. '210
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, an ongoing case, demonstrates a
useful picture of the type of situation covered by the expropriation
exception. In this case, Maria Altmann seeks to recover ownership
and possession of six paintings by the world-renowned artist Gustav
Klimt, which the Nazis stole in the early 1940s from her family in
Austria, and which currently are possessed by the Austrian Gallery, an
instrumentality of the Republic of Austria. 211 The facts of Altmann
represent a vivid example of the large-scale art theft perpetrated
against Jews and other subject nationalities by the forces of the Third
Reich.
204. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethi-
opia, 616 F. Supp. 660, 663 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (finding that majority stock interest,
which conferred control over physical assets of company, fell within exception).
205. Zappia, 215 F.3d at 252; First Fid. Bank v. Gov't of Antigua & Barbuda, 877
F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1989).
206. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 19-20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6618; Zappia, 215 F.3d at 251.
207. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6618; Zappia, 215 F.3d at 251.
208. Zappia, 215 F.3d at 251; see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 685 (1976).
209. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711-12
(9th Cir. 1992); West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831-832 (9th
Cir. 1987); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 712(1), § 712 cmt. f.
210. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 712 cmt. c; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at
19-20, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6618.
211. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (AIt-
mann II), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 46 (2003).
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The paintings at issue were owned by Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer,
the plaintiffs uncle. Ferdinand left Austria in 1938, after the Nazi
invasion and the resulting anschluss of Austria. 212 The Nazis took his
home, his sugar business, and his artwork, and four hundred pieces of
his vast porcelain collection were sold at public auction.21 3 Several
nineteenth-century Austrian paintings went to Adolf Hitler's and Her-
man G6ring's private collections. 214 Dr. Erich Fuerher, a Nazi lawyer
responsible for liquidating Ferdinand's collection, also selected a few
works for his own collection.215 Two of the paintings at issue in the
case, Adele Bloch-Bauer I and Apple Tree I, were given by Dr. Fu-
erher to the Austrian Gallery in 1941, in exchange for a painting,
Schloss Kammer am Attersee III, that Ferdinand had donated in
1936.216 This purported gift was accompanied by a note, signed "Heil
Hitler," in which Dr. Fuerher claimed to be making the donation in
fulfillment of Adele Bloch-Bauer's last will and testament. 21 7 Dr. Fu-
erher sold Beechwood in November 1942 to the Museum of the City
of Vienna, and in March 1943, he sold Adele Bloch-Bauer II to the
Austrian Gallery. Schloss Kammer am Attersee III was later sold to
Gustav Klimt's son, and in 1961 it was donated to the Austrian
Gallery. 2
18
Although Ferdinand died soon after the war in Europe ended, he
had taken preliminary steps to retrieve his stolen property.219 The
Austrian Republic enacted a law in 1946 deeming all transactions that
were motivated by discriminatory Nazi ideology to be null and
void. 220 The Republic, however, often required the original owners of
such property to repay the purchase price to the purchaser before an
item would have to be returned. 221 In addition, the Republic effec-
tively extorted "donations" of certain works of art from the claimant's
family in exchange for export permits to allow the removal of other
artworks from the country.222 The Altmann courts found that these
212. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(Altmann 1), af)fd, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (Altmann II), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
46 (2003).
213. Id.
214. Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 959.
215. Id.
216. See id.; Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
217. Altmann 1H, 317 F.3d at 959-60.
218. Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 n.6.
219. Id. at 1193.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 960.
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allegations established a prima facie case for jurisdiction under the
expropriation clause of the FSIA.
223
The arguments raised against jurisdiction in the Altmann line of
cases mirror those raised by the defendants in other FSIA cases in-
volving pre-1952 facts, such as Joo,224 Jackson,225 Carl Marks,226
and Princz,227 namely:
1. Whether the FSIA is a jurisdictional statute that applies to ac-
tions arising from operative facts that occurred before or after
the effective date of the statute or the 1952 Tate Letter without
regard to when the action accrued;
2. Whether the FSIA is a procedural statute that applies to ac-
tions arising from operative facts that occurred before the ef-
fective date of the statute and before 1952 because it does not
affect antecedent rights of the parties and thus is not
retroactive;
3. If the application of the FSIA to pre-enactment conduct or to
pre-1952 conduct does in fact affect substantive rights of state
parties, namely rights to sovereign immunity under customary
international law, whether the retroactive application of the
statute was clearly indicated and intended by Congress based
on the terms of the FSIA and its legislative history; and
4. Whether the conduct of the Nazi regime and its agencies and
instrumentalities in World War II should have defeated the
expectations of these state parties that they would receive im-
munity from prosecution in foreign courts, thus refuting the
claim that retroactive application of the FSIA actually violates
substantive rights under customary international law.
The following sections address these issues in turn, and conclude
that the FSIA does apply to provide jurisdiction over suits arising from
pre-1952 war crimes involving plunder and expropriation.
223. See Altmann 1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; Altmann I, 317 F.3d at 959.
224. Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding FSIA inapplicable to
WWII-era suit against Japan for abuse of "comfort women").
225. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1491 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(holding that FSIA did not apply retroactively to suit arising from 1911 Chinese bond
issue).
226. Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 665 F. Supp. 323,
336-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that FSIA did not
apply retroactively to suit arising from 1916 Russian Imperial Bond issue).
227. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(finding strong arguments in favor of applying FSIA retroactively, but, not faced with
retroactivity issue directly, declining to rule on FSIA's applicability in suit against
Germany arising from WWII internment in concentration camps).
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IV.
THE FSIA IS A JURISDICTIONAL STATUTE
Since the very beginning, the concept of sovereign immunity has
primarily concerned the jurisdiction of the courts, not the substantive
issues involving liability of foreign states for their actions or involving
justiciability of issues pertaining to the actions of a foreign govern-
ment (the act of state doctrine) or foreign heads of state (the head of
state doctrine). Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange
made his determination on the basis of jurisdiction,228 and found that
the justiciability argument was not worthy of extended discussion.
229
The Schooner Exchange Court stated:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by
the nation as an independent sovereign power.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not im-
posed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such
restriction. 230
There was no question in the Court's mind of the power of courts
to hear these cases. 231 At issue was not whether states had a right to
sovereign immunity within the territory of another sovereign, but
whether it was appropriate for the territorial sovereign to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction over actions involving a friendly foreign sover-
eign out of respect for his sovereignty and as a matter of comity and
good offices.
232
The Santissima Trinidad confirmed that courts were competent to
hear cases involving foreign sovereigns as a matter of jurisdictional
power, and that the fact that a foreign sovereign appears voluntarily or
feels compelled by circumstances to join an action as a suitor to pro-
tect his private interests does not oust the court of its jurisdiction over
the matter.233 The Court went on to find that it was appropriate for the
district court to maintain jurisdiction over the alleged prize of a for-
eign sovereign, as the seeking of prizes was a private activity of a
228. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812).
229. Id. at 146.
230. Id. at 136.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 136-37.
233. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353-54 (1822).
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
2004]
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
foreign state rather than a public activity for which jurisdiction might
be withheld.
234
The Supreme Court continued to view the issue of sovereign im-
munity as one of jurisdiction in the twentieth century. Ex parte
Muir,235 Pesaro J,236 Pesaro jj,237 and Pesaro 111238 each determined
the issue of sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue. Chief Justice
Stone's trilogy of The Navemar,239 Ex parte Peru ,24 and Hoffman
24 1
each held that sovereign immunity was an issue of jurisdiction rather
than justiciability, and held that the courts were competent to deter-
mine the issues of immunity from jurisdiction with or without the in-
put of the executive branch. 242 After 1952, courts continued to regard
sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue.
243
The FSIA did not create, but merely codified, the law of sover-
eign immunity. 244 It did not create jurisdiction where none existed-
it merely clarified the circumstances in which courts would and would
not exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, and took the deci-
sion-making authority regarding this determination away from the ex-
ecutive branch and placed it firmly within the purview of the courts.
245
234. See id. at 352-53.
235. 254 U.S. 522, 532 (1921).
236. The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216, 217-18 (1921).
237. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
238. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 570 (1926).
239. 303 U.S. 68, 69 (1938).
240. 318 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943).
241. 324 U.S. 30, 32 (1945).
242. E.g., Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34-35 ("In the absence of recognition of the claimed
immunity by the political branch of the government, the courts may decide for them-
selves whether all the requisites of immunity exist."); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 587
("Here the district court acquired jurisdiction in rem by the seizure and control of the
vessel, and the libelant's claim against the vessel constituted a case or controversy
which the court had authority to decide. Indeed, for the purpose of determining
whether petitioner was entitled to the claimed immunity, the district court, in the ab-
sence of recognition of the immunity by the Department of State, had authority to
decide for itself whether all the requisites for such immunity existed .... ); Compa-
nia Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75 (1938)
("[T]he want of admiralty jurisdiction because of the alleged public status of the ves-
sel and the right of the Spanish Government to demand possession of the vessel as
owner if it so elected, were appropriate subjects for judicial inquiry upon proof of the
matters alleged.").
243. See, e.g., Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362
(1955); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
244. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
245. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6605-06; WRIGTrr ET AL., supra note 10, § 3662, at 160-61.
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The Supreme Court interpreted the FSIA as removing the ex-
isting federal jurisdictional bases for suits against foreign sovereigns
from the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; diversity jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333; inter-
pleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335; commerce and antitrust, 28 U.S.C. § 1337;
and patents, copyrights, and trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1338; and plac-
ing the exclusive basis for federal jurisdiction over suits against for-
eign sovereigns in 28 U.S.C. § 1330.246 Thus, the FSIA remoyed
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns from these various other catego-
ries of federal jurisdiction and placed it within a new category of fed-
eral question jurisdiction, supported by the fact that suits against
foreign sovereigns invariably involve federal issues of U.S. foreign
policy and international law, making them proper topics for Article III
"arising under" federal question jurisdiction. 247 In this respect, the
FSIA is a quintessential jurisdiction-allocating statute.
Courts apply newly enacted jurisdiction-allocating statutes to
pending cases because the circumstances fail to implicate the condi-
tions for the general presumption against retroactivity. 248 As stated in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products:
Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually "takes away no
substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the
case." Present law normally governs in such situations because ju-
risdictional statutes "speak to the power of the court rather than to
the rights or obligations of the parties. '2
4 9
And in Hughes Aircraft, the Court stated that "[s]tatutes merely ad-
dressing which court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a particular
cause of action can fairly be said merely to regulate the secondary
conduct of litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of the
parties." 25
0
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue of
retroactivity and the FSIA, the concept has been involved in several
cases. The Court in First National City Bank did not question the
applicability of the FSIA to conduct (Cuban expropriations) occurring
246. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437-38
(1989).
247. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493-94. Suits initiated by foreign states still may be
brought under the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).
248. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 951
(1997).
249. 511 U.S. 244, 274-75 (1994) (citations omitted).
250. Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 951.
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in 1960-61 .251 The Verlinden Court did not question the applicability
of the FSIA to transactions occurring in 1975.252 Earlier, in reference
to the Tate Letter of 1952 that was codified into the FSIA, the Na-
tional City Bank of New York Court applied the principles of the 1952
letter to transactions occurring in 1920 and 1947-48.253
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that the FSIA did not answer
the act of state issues in the case because the FSIA was a jurisdictional
provision that did not change antecedent rights of sovereign na-
tions.254 This contrasts with Hughes Aircraft, in which an amendment
to a jurisdictional provision of the federal False Claims Act removed
the bar to qui tam actions that arose from facts previously reported to
the government. 255 This amendment took away an affirmative defense
possessed by the government contractor defendants, and in effect cre-
ated a new qui tam cause of action for false claims previously dis-
closed to the government where none had existed before.
256
The FSIA also contrasts with the Landgraf case, in which provi-
sions of Civil Rights Act of 1991, creating the right to recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages for certain violations of Title VII,
substantially changed defendants' exposure to liability and increased
the damages to which defendants might be called upon to pay, and
thus attached new legal consequences to events completed before its
enactment.2 57 In contrast to the provision in the 1991 Act that pro-
vided for a jury trial in cases in which compensatory damages were
claimed, which the Supreme Court held to be a purely procedural
change, the provision providing for the recovery of compensatory
damages created a new cause of action for monetary relief for persons
who were victims of a hostile work environment but were not con-
structively discharged, and it created a new potential liability for dam-
ages for their employers. 258 Thus, the Act was not a purely procedural
or jurisdictional provision that could be applied to pending actions
arising from facts predating the effective date of the statute.
251. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 619-21 (1983).
252. 461 U.S. at 483-89.
253. 348 U.S. at 357-66. Similarly, in 1954 the Bernstein court applied the princi-
ples stated in the 1949 Tate Letter to Nazi conduct which occurred before and during
World War 11 (1937-42). Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoom-
vaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 375-76 (2d Cir. 1954).
254. First Nat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 620-21.
255. Hughes Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 946.
256. Id. at 948-50.
257. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250, 282-83 (1994).
258. Id. at 283.
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The FSIA did not take away an affirmative defense of foreign
sovereigns and did not change the legal consequences of acts com-
pleted before the effective date of the statute. Sovereign immunity
always has been regarded as a matter of comity and grace extended by
the good will of a territorial sovereign, never as a right of the foreign
sovereign that supports a demand that the jurisdiction of the territorial
courts be withdrawn. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA and prior to
the 1952 Tate Letter, the jurisdictional power of U.S. courts to enter-
tain suits involving foreign sovereigns was not questioned 2 59 and in
the absence of proper suggestions of immunity asserted through
proper channels, jurisdiction over the foreign states remained intact in
spite of the foreign governments' attempts to communicate a defense
of immunity through other channels. 260 Recommendations of the
State Department were not consistently made-sometimes a negative
recommendation was made, sometimes a request was communicated
without comment on the merits of the claim, and sometimes the exec-
utive branch simply was silent in the face of requests. A favorable
suggestion of immunity depended on the good will and good relations
between the United States and the foreign sovereign at the time of the
suit, not at the time of the events from which the suit arose.26 ' Noth-
ing in the history of sovereign immunity in the United States supports
a vested right of a foreign sovereign to assert an affirmative defense of
absolute immunity in United States courts.
The Supreme Court has followed this history by interpreting the
FSIA as a jurisdictional provision requiring the courts to evaluate the
state of affairs of the foreign sovereign at the time of suit, not at the
time when the events occurred.262 The defendant in Dole Food at-
tempted to assert an affirmative defense based on its status as a for-
eign state-owned enterprise at the time when the events of the suit
occurred. 263 The Court rejected the claim, noting that the defendant
259. See supra notes 228-242 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303
U.S. 68 (1938); The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924); Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey,
256 U.S. 616 (1921); Exparte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921); The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216
(1921) (Pesaro 1).
261. See, e.g., Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (noting Court's consideration
of good relations between Peru and United States at time of suit); The Navemar, 303
U.S. at 75-76 (considering status of ship requisitioned by Spanish government at time
of suit); The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. at 91 (considering status of Turkish ship in light of
breakoff in relations between United States and Ottoman Turkey at time of suit); Ex
parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. at 618-19 (same); Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. at 523
(considering British requisition of ship for use as admiralty transport at time of suit).
262. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2003).
263. Id. at 1662.
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ceased to be majority-owned and controlled by a foreign state at the
time the suit was filed, and thus held that the defendant failed to meet
the definition of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign sovereign
under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). 264 The Court stated that the ruling was
"consistent with the 'longstanding principle that the jurisdiction of the
Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action
brought.' "265
Cases that have rejected the argument that the FSIA is a purely
jurisdictional provision have ignored the law, history and United
States practice of sovereign immunity embodied in the FSIA. The
Second Circuit decision in Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie
Nationale Algerienne de Navigation is inapposite, because it held that
section 1610 of the FSIA did not apply in a suit pending on the effec-
tive date of the Act because the operative language of this section
states: "property... [shall not be] immune from attachment.., after
the effective date of the Act."'266 This clearly indicates that this partic-
ular provision of the FSIA was to have a prospective application.
The Second Circuit took up the issue again in Corporacion
Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., disagreeing with the
lower court that the FSIA applied retroactively to confer jurisdiction
over a suit pending on the FSIA's effective date, but, because it found
an alternate source of federal jurisdiction, failing to discuss its reasons
in depth.267
Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
Jackson v. People's Republic of China took issue with the proposition
that the FSIA did not disturb settled expectations rising to the level of
264. Id. at 1663.
265. Id. at 1662 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993)
(quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824))).
266. 605 F.2d 648, 654 (2d. Cir. 1979); 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2002). The Court distin-
guished Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), and Nat'l Am. Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 638-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), which had applied the jurisdictional provisions of the act to an ac-
tion pending on the effective date, on the basis of the "after the effective date" lan-
guage which appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1610 but not in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602, and
1608. See Amoco Overseas, 605 F.2d at 653-54. The Amoco Overseas holding,
however, actually supports the construction of the FSIA that the jurisdictional provi-
sions of the FSIA were intended to apply to actions whose facts predate the enactment
of the FSIA; if Congress saw fit to expressly limit the operation of certain provisions
to a time after the effective date of the statute, it can logically be inferred that Con-
gress intended provisions without this limitation to apply to suits arising from facts
that predate the effective date. See discussion infra Part VI.
267. 629 F.2d 786, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1980).
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antecedent rights to immunity from suit in American courts, 268 and
thus are more properly discussed in Section IV below. These opinions
remain intact and are good law within their respective circuits, even
though courts have questioned the viability of their holdings after
Landgraf.
269
Since Landgraf, courts have increasingly recognized that the
FSIA is a jurisdictional statute that consolidated jurisdiction from sev-
eral federal jurisdictional provisions into one provision, and did not
create a new forum where no competent forum existed before, nor did
it change the substantive rights of foreign states under the United
States law of sovereign immunity prior to 1952 and prior to the stat-
ute's effective date.270 Joo v. Japan27 1 is the most notable exception.
The Second Circuit remains a holdout. In Abrams v. Socijtj Na-
tionale des Chemins de Fer Fran~ais, the Second Circuit discussed
the jurisdictional status of the FSIA in the context of claims against
the French national railroad company for torts committed in the trans-
portation of French holocaust victims to death camps during World
War 11. 272 On appeal from the ruling of the trial court that the action
should be dismissed because no exceptions to sovereign immunity
from jurisdiction applied, regardless of the issue of retroactivity, the
parties agreed that if the FSIA applied to the case, the trial court
would have no jurisdiction because none of the exceptions to immu-
nity in the act apply to the claims raised in the sUit.2 7 3 The question
posed by the plaintiffs-appellants on appeal was the retroactivity ques-
tion avoided by the district court. The Second Circuit did not answer
the question, but reversed and remanded the case, requiring the district
268. See Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics., 841 F.2d 26, 27
(2d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497-98 (1 1th
Cir. 1986).
269. E.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (Altmann I), aff'd, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (Altmann II), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 46 (2003); Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland), 68 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 945-46 (N.D. I11. 1999), aft'd, 215 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2000); Princz v.
Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
270. See, e.g., Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 963-64 (holding that FSIA applies to Nazi
plunder of artwork before and during WWII); Haven, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 944-46 (hold-
ing that FSIA applies to events during and shortly after end of WWII); Creighton Ltd.
v. Gov't of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 121-24 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that FSIA is juris-
dictional statute and does not implicate retroactivity concerns under Landgraf stan-
dards); Crist v. Republic of Turkey, 995 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that
FSIA applies to events in 1974); Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170-71 (suggesting that FSIA is
jurisdictional statute that does not implicate retroactivity concerns under Landgraf
standards, but deciding case on other grounds).
271. 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
272. 332 F.3d 173, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2003).
273. Id. at 174-75, 179.
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court to answer the retroactivity question directly by applying the two
step Landgraf test 274 and, in particular, to determine whether applica-
tion of the test would alter the vested rights of the defendant under
World War II-era law. 275 The court indicated its view that Congress
did not clearly express an intention to make the FSIA apply retroac-
tively under step one of the Landgraf analysis, and appeared to cast
doubt on a finding that the FSIA ultimately has no effect on the rights
and liabilities of the parties with regard to their actions in the World
War II holocaust era.276 Nevertheless, the court felt more information
needed to be developed in the record regarding the expectations of a
belligerent nation in World War II, and remanded the case for the
development of this information to answer the retroactivity ques-
tion.277 The Second Circuit followed the same practice in the consoli-
dated appeals from the dismissal of claims of Jews dispossessed of
property in Poland and Austria during and after World War II in Garb
v. Republic of Poland and Whiteman v. Republic of Austria.278
The Abrams, Garb and Whiteman cases in the Second Circuit
seem to fly in the face of Dole Food. In Dole Food, the Supreme
Court already determined that the FSIA is a jurisdictional statute pro-
viding a procedural, jurisdictional immunity rather than a substantive,
status-based immunity. And, as a jurisdictional immunity statute, the
relevant time period for evaluating the foreign sovereign's rights to
immunity is the time of filing of the suit, not its status or expectations
at the time the events of the action transpired.279 The defendant in
Dole Food would have enjoyed immunity under the state instrumen-
274. Landgraf set out two steps to determine whether a statute operates in a retroac-
tive manner:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit,
the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly pre-
scribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course,
there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the
statute contains no such express command, the court must determine
whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transac-
tions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our
traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear con-
gressional intent favoring such a result.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1993).
275. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 185-87.
276. Id. at 184-85.
277. Id. at 187-88.
278. Garb v. Republic of Poland, Nos. 02-7844, 02-9361, 02-3087, 2003 WL
21890843 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2003), Whiteman v. Republic of Austria, No. 00 Civ.
8006(SWK), 2002 WL 31368236 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002).
279. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2003).
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tality provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1603 if it had been sued at the time of
the transactions from which the action arose because it was, at that
time, a majority state-owned enterprise; the Supreme Court held, how-
ever, that the status at time of filing of the suit was all that
mattered.
280
This holding must be viewed in light of three other principles of
sovereign immunity in United States law. First, the Supreme Court,
since the time of The Schooner Exchange and The Santissima Trini-
dad, has made abundantly clear that sovereign immunity was a privi-
lege extended by comity in the interests of foreign policy and could be
removed at any time by giving notice. 281 Second, the executive
branch gave notice to foreign states from time to time regarding the
extension or withholding of immunity in certain situations-most im-
portant to the present analysis are the publications regarding the free-
dom of U.S. courts to adjudicate claims arising from the actions of
Nazi Germany and its affiliates in World War 11,282 and the later an-
nouncement reaffirming the executive branch's intent to follow the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the 1952 Tate Letter. The
FSIA is yet another proclamation of the United States in this series
informing the world of the terms under which the United States will
and will not extend jurisdictional immunity to foreign sovereigns.
Third, sovereign immunity decisions have always been made at the
time of suit, and foreign sovereigns literally have sat at the mercy of
the State Department, which would make suggestions or withhold sug-
gestions based on the status of relations with the foreign power at the
time of the suit, not at the time the events from which the suit arose
transpired. 283 Thus, any expectations as to immunity must have been
formed at the time of suit, not at the time the operative events oc-
cuffed. This is the principle affirmed recently in Dole Food.2 84 Al-
though no court has expressed this concept in these terms, there are
examples of the Supreme Court applying the 1952 Tate Letter to con-
duct occurring in 1920 and 1947-48, and applying the FSIA to con-
duct occurring in 1960 and 1975 because the evaluation of immunity
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 123 (1812); New
Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp.
120, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Iran
Nat'l Airlines Corp. v. Marschalk Co. Inc, 453 U.S. 919 (1981); Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 142-147.
283. See Dole Food, 123 S. Ct. at 1663.
284. Id.
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was made at the time of suit, not based on the time period when the
action accrued.
285
In light of this analysis, in Abrams, Garb, and Whiteman, the
Second Circuit may have sent the lower court on a wild goose chase.
Any expectation of immunity must be formed at the time of suit, not at
the time of the events from which the action arose. If this is the
broader holding of Dole Food, which affirms the history of the United
States law and practice of sovereign immunity summarized in the par-
agraph above, then the Second Circuit merely should evaluate what
the defendants' expectations should have been at the time of filing of
the suit, under the regime enacted in the FSIA.
2 86
V.
THE APPLICATION OF THE FSIA DOES NOT AFFECT
ANTECEDENT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
As described above, Landgraf presented two steps for the court
to determine if a statute has a retroactive effect: first, whether Con-
gress expressly indicated that the new statute was or was not to be
applied retroactively, and second, "whether the new statute would
have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct,
or impose new duties with respect to transactions already com-
pleted. '287 This article will discuss these steps in reverse order, be-
cause the evidence regarding whether or not the FSIA has a retroactive
effect is much stronger than the evidence of congressional intent as to
whether the statute was designed to operate retroactively.
Landgraf stated that "[elven absent specific legislative authoriza-
tion, application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is un-
questionably proper in many situations," 288 and that a statute does not
operate retrospectively, and thus impermissibly, "merely because it is
applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enact-
ment or upsets expectations based in prior law."' 289 Rather, according
to Landgraf, "the court must ask whether the new provision attaches
285. See supra text accompanying notes 251-253.
286. Ironically, the Abrams court did just that by applying the FSIA and Dole Food
to the issue of the sovereign status of the French railroad company as of the filing of
the suit. The court determined that the entity was a majority state-owned entity under
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) at the time of filing, and thus was eligible for the immunity
provisions of the FSIA. Abrams v. Soci~td Nationale des Chemins de Fer Franqais,
332 F.3d 173, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2003).
287. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
288. Id. at 273.
289. Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
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new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment,"
and must consider "the nature and extent of the change in the law and
the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a
relevant past event. ' 290 Quoting Justice Story, the court continued:
"[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past, must be deemed retrospective." '2
9'
By contrast, statutes that confer or deny jurisdiction or change
procedural rules may be applied in suits arising before their enactment
without raising concerns about retroactivity. 292 The Supreme Court
reviewed several cases involving procedural or remedial changes that
were held not to affect antecedent rights in an impermissible way:
In Thorpe, we held that an agency circular requiring a local hous-
ing authority to give notice of reasons and opportunity to respond
before evicting a tenant was applicable to an eviction proceeding
commenced before the regulation issued. Thorpe shares much with
both the "procedural" and "prospective-relief' cases. Thus, we
noted in Thorpe that new hearing procedures did not affect either
party's obligations under the lease agreement between the housing
authority and the petitioner, and, because the tenant had "not yet
vacated," we saw no significance in the fact that the housing au-
thority had "decided to evict her before the circular was issued."
The Court in Thorpe viewed the new eviction procedures as "es-
sential to remove a serious impediment to the successful protection
of constitutional rights ..
Like the new hearing requirement in Thorpe, the attorney's fee pro-
vision at issue in Bradley did not resemble the cases in which we
have invoked the presumption against statutory retroactivity. At-
torney's fee determinations, we have observed, are "collateral to
290. Id. at 269-70.
291. Id. at 269 (quoting Soc'y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas.
756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156) (Story, J.)).
292. Id. at 274-75.
Changes in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before
their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity.... Because
rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the
fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise
to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive.
Id. at 275 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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the main cause of action" and "uniquely separable from the cause
of action to be proved at trial."
'2 9 3
Sovereign immunity determinations, similarly, are collateral to
the main cause of action and are separable from the cause of action to
be proved at trial. At most, the FSIA may be viewed as removing
certain impediments to the successful prosecution of rights, such as
the difficulties of serving process on foreign sovereigns2 94 and execut-
ing on judgments obtained against foreign sovereigns,2 95 which are
procedural and remedial effects that are not impermissibly retroactive
in nature. The immunity provisions are procedural and jurisdictional
provisions that affect where and how suits against a foreign sovereign
may be brought, but do not create a competent forum where none ex-
isted before, because United States courts consistently have held that
federal courts have the power to adjudicate claims against foreign sov-
ereigns. The determination of immunity is a collateral determination,
separable from the merits of the suit, that addresses whether the court
should refrain from exercising its power based on the circumstances at
the time of filing of the action.
The Supreme Court has held that the FSIA was not intended to
affect substantive law concerning the rights of foreign states.296 Sec-
tion 1606 of the FSIA provides that "[a]s to any claim for relief with
respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity .. , the
foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances .... ,,297 The legisla-
tive history of the FSIA confirms this fact:
The bill is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability.
Nor is it intended to affect .. the attribution of responsibility be-
tween or among entities of a foreign state; for example, whether the
proper entity of a foreign state has been sued, or whether an entity
sued is liable in whole or in part for the claimed wrong.
29 8
293. Id. at 276-77 (citing Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969);
Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974)) (citations omitted) (footnote
omitted).
294. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2000).
295. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2000).
296. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 620-21 (1983) ("The language and history of the FSIA clearly establish that the
Act was not intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a for-
eign state or instrumentality, or the attribution of liability among instrumentalities of a
foreign state.").
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2000).
298. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6610.
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The FSIA did not create a new federal cause of action, but did
remove certain impediments to existing federal causes of action under
diversity jurisdiction, admiralty jurisdiction, Alien Tort Act claims, or
other federal jurisdictional statutes. 299 The major change intended and
accomplished by the FSIA was to remove the case by case decision-
making authority as to sovereign immunity from the executive branch
and place it with the judicial branch.3°° The FSIA also codified the
existing law of sovereign immunity, and in so doing, clarified the
terms under which foreign sovereigns would and would not enjoy im-
munity. 301 If anything, these changes did not divest foreign states of
settled expectations; instead, they clarified unsettled and uncertain ex-
pectations as to whether the state of relations between the foreign state
and the United States at the time of suit would prompt the State De-
partment to take a position in favor of immunity in a given matter, or
whether the foreign state would have to subject itself to the power of
the court in order to defend its rights.
Virtually every court that has addressed the issue has found that
the FSIA should be applied to actions whose operative facts predate
the effective date of the Act in January 1977, so long as the facts
postdate the 1952 Tate Letter.302 It is tempting to speculate on why
the courts might find that an impermissible retroactive effect of the
299. The D.C. Circuit observed in Gilson v. Republic of Ireland:
While [the] FSIA was by all accounts an important piece of legislation, it
is a great exaggeration to say that plaintiff was without remedy before it
became effective.... It may be true ... that the Act curtailed the possi-
bility of the Department of State intervening here with its own plea of
sovereign immunity for the defendants, removed certain procedural ob-
stacles, and increased the property available to plaintiff for judgment.
But to say that any action was effectively barred before FSIA is not true.
682 F.2d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia, 193
F. Supp. 2d 165, 173-74 (D.D.C. 2002).
300. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426-27
(2d Cir. 1987).
301. Id. at 427.
302. See, e.g., Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d
26, 27 (2d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497
(11 th Cir. 1986); Turkmani, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 174; Djordjevich v. Bundesminister
der Finanzen, Fed. Republic of Germany, 827 F. Supp. 814, 817 (D.D.C. 1993), afftd,
124 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Slade v. United States of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351,
355-58 (D.D.C. 1985), aftd, 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also cases cited
supra notes 241-242. The holdouts cited earlier, Amoco Overseas and Corporacion
Venezolana, are questionable in light of later decisions of the Second Circuit, namely
Carl Marks and Abrams. See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Al-
gerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1979); Corporacion Venezo-
lana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1980); Carl
Marks, 841 F.2d 26; Abrams v. Soci&td Nationale des Chemins de Fer Frangais, 332
F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003); supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text.
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FSIA apparently does not kick in until the operative facts are twenty-
five years old or older. Giving these courts the benefit of the doubt,
their holdings rest on the perception that the 1952 Tate Letter con-
founded otherwise settled expectations of complete and absolute im-
munity from suit in the United States, which had risen to the level of
antecedent rights, so that only after 1952, would a foreign sovereign
expect to be haled before a U.S. court for private activities. 30 3 This
interpretation misreads the history of sovereign immunity in the
United States in the twentieth century prior to 1952.
The FSIA did not remove antecedent rights enjoyed by foreign
states prior to the Tate Letter.30 4 Nothing in the history of the law and
practice of sovereign immunity would indicate to a foreign sovereign
that it was entitled to enjoy immunity from suit within the territory of
another sovereign; in contrast, the courts and executive branch con-
stantly reiterated that the jurisdiction of United States courts was
waived as an exercise of comity for the promotion of good foreign
policy and international relations. 30 5 If anything, a foreign state
should only have felt a right to request immunity through a properly
sanctioned channel; the United States' practice and interpretation of
the classical and restrictive theories of sovereign immunity before and
after the 1952 Tate Letter would not have confirmed any absolute enti-
tlement to immunity from suit with regard to "private" actions of the
sovereign. Thus, the FSIA does not have an impermissible retroactive
effect when applied to actions whose operative facts predate the stat-
ute's effective date and predate the 1952 Tate Letter.
VI.
CONGRESS INTENDED THE FSIA
TO APPLY RETROACTIVELY
According to Landgraf,
[T]he court's first task is to determine whether Congress has ex-
pressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done
so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules.
When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the
court must determine whether the new statute would have retroac-
tive effect .... 306
303. Carl Marks, 841 F.2d at 27; Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1497-98; Garb v. Republic of
Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
304. See cases cited supra note 270.
305. See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
306. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
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Lindh v. Murphy elaborated on Landgraf, holding that the normal
rules of construction generally apply when a court determines the tem-
poral reach of a statute. 307 However, if Congress is to be regarded as
intending a retroactive effect to a civil statute, the command or direc-
tive to apply the statute retroactively must be "clear" and "express.
30 8
In Lindh, an amendment to the habeas corpus statute was held to
be inapplicable to non-capital cases pending at the time of the amend-
ment's enactment. 30 9 The Supreme Court noted that a simultaneously-
enacted provision on capital cases expressly required application to
then-pending cases, and reasoned that this express requirement, by
negative implication, showed that the amendments pertinent to non-
capital cases were meant to apply only to cases filed after the amend-
ments' enactments.
310
The converse of this situation occurs in the FSIA. The FSIA ex-
pressly provides that "property in the United States of a foreign state,
as defined in section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial
activity in the United States.... shall not be immune from attachment
• ..after the effective date of this Act .... "311 This prospective
language occurs only in section 1610, not in the provisions of the
FSIA regarding 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-09, and 1611. Thus, by
negative implication as described in Lindh, Congress intended these
other sections to have a retrospective application.
312
Other courts have found an implication of retroactivity in the lan-
guage of various sections of the FSIA. In declaring the purpose of the
FSIA, Congress directed that "[c]laims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the
States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.
313
The Princz court found that this statement of purpose suggested that
Congress intended the FSIA apply to all cases decided after its enact-
ment, regardless of when the plaintiffs cause of action actually ac-
crued. 314 However, other courts have drawn the opposite conclusion,
307. 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997).
308. Id. at 325-26.
309. Id. at 326-27.
310. Id.
311. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2000).
312. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
and Nat'l Am. Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 638-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), applied the jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA actions pending on the effec-
tive date, on the basis that the "after the effective date" language appearing in 28
U.S.C. § 1610 and not in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602, and 1608 indicated that these
latter sections may have been intended by Congress to have retroactive application.
313. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
314. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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finding that the "henceforth" language indicates a prospective
intention. 3
15
In addition, a message of retroactivity has been discerned in the
design of the FSIA. When it enacted the FSIA, Congress deleted from
28 U.S.C. § 1332 the provision for diversity jurisdiction over suits
brought by a United States citizen against a foreign government. Ac-
cording to the legislative history, "[s]ince jurisdiction in actions
against foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new section
1330, a similar jurisdictional basis under section 1332 becomes super-
fluous. '316 The Princz court held that:
Unless one is to infer that the Congress intentionally but silently
denied a federal forum for all suits against a foreign sovereign aris-
ing under federal law that were filed after enactment of the FSIA
but based upon pre-FSIA facts, the implication is strong that all
questions of foreign sovereign immunity, including those that in-
volve an act of a foreign government taken before 1976, are to be
decided under the FSIA.3 17
Although persuasive, these arguments based on the structure and
language of the FSIA are not as compelling as the fact that the FSIA
codified the law of sovereign immunity in the United States. That law
had held that determinations of immunity are to be made at the time of
filing of the suit on a case-by-case basis, based on facts that are prop-
erly submitted to the court through official channels, and in light of
the notice given to foreign states through the public announcements of
the State Department and the executive branch's suggestions of immu-
nity made during the course of the suit. In that judicial determinations
naturally have a retroactive application with respect to the parties in
the litigation and regarding any other similarly situated parties in
pending or future cases bound through stare decisis by the judicial
determination, Congress adopted and codified a system that was inher-
315. As evidence of the FSIA's prospective reach, these courts have focused on both
the "henceforth" language of 28 U.S.C. § 1602 and Congress' decision to delay the
effective date of the FSIA for ninety days. Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 8, 90 Stat. 2891,
2898 (1976); see Slade v. United States of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D.D.C.
1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Jackson v. People's Republic of China,
596 F. Supp. 386, 388 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aft'd, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986). Carl
Marks asserted that the provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) that district courts "shall
have" jurisdiction over cases specified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605 and 1607 indicates an
intention for the statute to have prospective application. Carl Marks v. Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, 665 F. Supp. 323, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1988).
316. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6613.
317. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170 (citation omitted).
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ently retroactive. In the absence of clear language, such as the express
prospective language found in section 1610 of the Act that the remain-
der of the FSIA was not to have retroactive effect, the FSIA should be
construed to apply to conduct that predates the 1952 Tate Letter.
VII.
EVALUATING NAZI GERMANY'S EXPECTATIONS OF
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR WAR CRIMES
If the foregoing arguments were to fail, and courts were to deter-
mine that the FSIA cannot be applied generally to actions whose oper-
ative facts occurred prior to 1952, there remains an argument that the
particular situation of the Nazi war crimes dictates that Germany has
no antecedent right to immunity that would be affected by an applica-
tion of the FSIA to lawsuits arising from these crimes. This last argu-
ment for application of the FSIA to World War II-era war crimes
involves an analysis of the reasonable expectations of Nazi Germany
and its agencies and instrumentalities that they would receive absolute
immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts. Nazi Germany
maintained these expectations despite three crucial facts: (1) Germany
was engaged in war with the United States at the time of the events;
(2) the State Department expressly indicated on multiple occasions
that U.S. courts were to be free from any restrictions on their jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate property claims arising from Nazi acts of plunder or
Nazi-influenced property transactions; and (3) the Nazis had engaged
injus cogens violations and other acts that violated established restric-
tions of customary and conventional international law, which civilized
nations would view as grounds to find a waiver of sovereign
immunity.
First, Germany should have no expectation of sovereign immu-
nity from the jurisdiction of United States courts during wartime.
From the beginning, United States authorities indicated that immunity
should be extended to "friendly" foreign sovereigns only; 318 obvi-
ously, an active belligerent engaged in armed conflict against the
United States is not a friendly foreign sovereign, as revealed by the
treatment of belligerent powers in actions arising from wars in which
the United States was involved.
319
318. E.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945); Ex parte
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283,
352-53 (1822); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144
(1812); The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24, 231 F. 365, 368 (D.N.J. 1916).
319. See cases cited supra note 45.
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Second, beyond the simple fact that a belligerent state engaged in
armed conflict against the United States should not expect to receive
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, the
State Department and executive branch of the United States made it
very clear on several occasions during and after World War II that
U.S. courts would entertain suits arising from acts of Nazi plunder,
looting, and discriminatory expropriation perpetrated against people
under their domination and control. 320 Sovereign immunity may be
withdrawn by giving notice, and the Nazi regime was given notice on
several occasions that immunity would not be extended to preclude
the redress in municipal courts of the United States of war crimes
involving the property of subject peoples.
32
1
Finally, there is the argument that the Nazis forfeited their rights,
if any, to sovereign immunity based on their perpetration of jus
cogens violations and other violations of firmly established restric-
tions of customary and conventional international law. This argument
was eloquently made by Judge Wald of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in her dissenting opinion in Princz,322 in which she stated:
In the mid-1940s, Germany could not, even in its wildest dreams,
have expected the executive branch of the United States, as a mat-
ter of grace and comity, to suggest immunity for its enslavement
and confinement (in three concentration camps) of an American
citizen during the Holocaust. The outcome of the Nuremberg trials
provides a clear signal that the international community, and partic-
ularly the United States-one of the four nations that established
the Nuremberg Tribunal-would not have supported a broad
enough immunity to shroud the atrocities committed during the
Holocaust. Indeed, the Nuremberg Tribunal denied the German de-
fendants' claims of official immunity because in the eyes of the
international community Germany as a whole was owed no immu-
nity: "[hie who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under Interna-
tional Law." Clearly, had the question been put to them, the United
States executive branch would have opted to deny Germany's
claims to immunity for the crimes alleged in this case.32
3
Judge Wald's cogent explanation of the international law impli-
cations of Nazi Germany's jus cogens violations needs no further illu-
mination. In Altmann II, the Ninth Circuit found Wald's rationale to
320. See supra text accompanying notes 142-147
321. Id.
322. 26 F.3d 1166, 1176-85 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 1179 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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be entirely persuasive, and adopted it in support of that court's deci-
sion to apply the FSIA to a case involving the plunder of art work
prior to and during World War 11.324
VI.
CONCLUSION
The FSIA should be construed as a jurisdictional statute whose
terms apply to actions arising from operative facts that arose prior to
the effective date of the Act, regardless of whether these facts also
occurred prior to the 1952 Tate Letter. The Tate Letter reaffirmed the
State Department's intent to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity in actions filed in United States courts, and the FSIA codi-
fied that practice. The Supreme Court in Dole Food already has con-
strued the FSIA as a jurisdictional statute, and as such, applied the
facts and circumstances concerning the foreign sovereign's claim to
immunity that existed at the time of filing of the action, not the facts
and circumstances at the time when the operative facts occurred.
When construed as a jurisdictional statute, as directed by the Supreme
Court in Dole Food, the FSIA does not present any retroactivity
issues.
The FSIA satisfies the second step of the Landgraf analysis, be-
cause the FSIA does not have an impermissible retroactive effect that
upsets vested, antecedent rights of the parties. The FSIA does not
affect the substantive causes of action, defenses, and liabilities of par-
ties concerning the merits of actions that predate or postdate the Tate
Letter, and merely effects certain procedural changes that remove ob-
stacles to the enforcement of plaintiffs' rights. Furthermore, to the
extent that a foreign state might have reasonably expected to receive
immunity from suits filed during the pre-1952 time period when the
United States' adherence to the restrictive theory of immunity was
more uncertain-an expectation that the FSIA either confirms or re-
buts depending on the public or private nature of the sovereign's
acts-this must be viewed as the type of wishful thinking based on an
existing legal climate that is disregarded upon the enactment of a pro-
cedural or remedial statute that changes the legal climate. It is akin to
situations discussed in Landgraf wherein a new property tax or zoning
regulation upsets the reasonable expectations that prompted those af-
fected to acquire property, or a new law banning gambling harms a
person who had either begun to construct a casino before the law's
324. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 963 (9th Cir. 2002).
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
20041
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
enactment or spent his life learning to count cards. 325 A foreign sov-
ereign's expectation that it will receive the privilege of sovereign im-
munity never has been, and never should be, viewed as an antecedent
right. Only statutes that affect the merits of the parties' claims and
defenses against each other by taking away or impairing vested rights
established under existing laws, or creating new obligations, imposing
new duties, or attaching new disabilities in respect to transactions or
considerations that are already past, may be deemed to be
retrospective.
326
The most compelling evidence that Congress intended the FSIA
to apply to events predating the statute is the fact that the Act ex-
pressly states that it codifies the existing law of sovereign immunity as
practiced in the United States. Determinations of immunity were
made at the time of filing of the suit on a case-by-case basis, based on
facts that were properly submitted to the court through official chan-
nels, and in light of the notice given to foreign states during the course
of the suit through the public announcements of the State Department
and the executive branch's suggestions of immunity. In that judicial
determinations naturally have a retroactive application with respect to
the parties in the litigation and regarding any other similarly situated
parties in pending or future cases bound through stare decisis by the
judicial determination, Congress adopted and codified a system that
was inherently retroactive.
Consideration of the issue of retroactivity with respect to World
War II-era war crimes must also include the fact that Nazi Germany
and its agencies and instrumentalities should have had no reasonable
expectation of immunity from suit. Belligerent powers do not enjoy
the immunities of friendly states in the territorial courts of the enemy.
The United States and the other allied powers made abundantly clear,
both in official communications during the war and in the Nuremberg
prosecutions after, that no restrictions would be placed on U.S. courts'
ability to adjudicate claims arising from the Nazis' plundering and
pillaging of Europe.
Therefore, the FSIA should be applied to provide jurisdiction
over Nazi war crimes of plunder and expropriation.
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